

The German Tribune

Hamburg, 5 July 1987
Twenty-sixth year - No. 1280 - By air

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF THE GERMAN PRESS

C 20725 C
ISSN 0016-8858

European leaders meet to try and keep the roof on

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

Europe today bears a strong resemblance to a half-finished building of which the exhausted owners have taken makeshift possession.

Some rooms are more or less habitable, while work on others has hardly begun. In some the carpenters are hard at work, in others everything has been *left as it was*.

Completion deadlines have long since passed and been consigned to convenient oblivion. The building hasn't even been topped out.

Yet although it may lack a roof the impressive exterior attracts numerous would-be tenants who would be only too happy to make it their home as it is and have no interest in the ambitious original plans.

It goes without saying that the building runs a serious risk of collapse unless it is completed — or at least fitted out with a roof.

Crisis is the quintessence of the European Community, and it is definitely the hallmark of the Brussels summit meeting of European Community leaders.

Community finances are the problem — even though the Federal Republic as its largest net paymaster is prepared to agree to higher contributions — as are other member-countries.

Yet that alone would be useless unless accompanied by a reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which has proved a bottomless pit.

Unintentionally, but negligently, fuses have been incorporated in the only fully integrated European market, the agricultural market, that threaten to blow the whole European edifice sky-high.

A senseless system of farm subsidies by means of exaggeratedly high prices has led, in conjunction with technical and biological modernisation of farming, to production surpluses that can no *longer be either financed or marketed*.

CAP already accounts for two thirds of the DM72bn Community budget (and will tend to grow still more expensive).

The budget is over DM10bn in the red, and no-one has any idea at present how the deficit is to be financed. A private company in this position would long have had to call in the receiver.

The European Community will survive because it has grown indispensable for the peoples of Europe, but it will not be able to muddle through in the way it so far succeeded in doing.

Growing cash problems urgently require a solution, and financing the Common Market was the main item on the summit agenda and an issue that brooked no further delay.

Few member-countries, if any, would deny that the Community needs more money and that any cash boost must be accompanied by a reform of farm policy.

Views differ, sad to say, on what shape this reform ought to take, and Bonn, which used to be a model of European propriety, has emerged as somewhat of a mischief-maker.



Weizsäcker in Greece

Bonn President Richard von Weizsäcker (left) with Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou. Weizsäcker spent five days in Greece on an official visit. Report page 2. (Photo: dpa)

Ignaz Kiechle, the German Agriculture Minister, consistently objects to any containment of the senseless surplus production by means of price cuts.

He is particularly opposed to proposals to abolish the border offset levy (charged on farm produce at the border to offset exchange rate changes), which would be to German farmers' further *disadvantage*.

Chancellor Kohl's Christian Democrats found themselves at the receiving end of farmers' and wine-growers' ire in recent state assembly elections, *especially in the Rhineland-Palatinate*.

Autumn polls in Schleswig-Holstein, also mainly *agricultural, could* be touch and go too. "Europeans" in Bonn have grown increasingly recal*citrant since CAP* reform plans began to make inroads into German farmers' established privileges. Herr Kiechle has even been known to use his veto to block majority decisions by *the Council of Ministers* — a move that used to be spurned as an anti-European, Gaullist *cardinal sin. In adv*ance of the Schleswig-Holstein elections the Bonn coalition of Chris*tian and Free Dem*ocrats has not even seen fit to appeal for understanding by its friends in Eu*rope. Instead, it has* gone it alone and approved a credit line of DM2bn for grants to German farmers. This may be said to be "advance national financing of future European Community grants, *but the fact remains that it is a reversion* to the errors of a nation-state approach.

Some member-countries may feel Bonn's move isn't such a bad idea. Let Bonn fund its own farmers, they argue, *especially now the Community hasn't* the cash to do so. But that no longer has anything to do with European integration.

Clashes of interest also prevail in the *dispute over the proposed Community* tax on imported fats and edible oils.

It would raise an estimated DM4bn in revenue for the Community but run the risk of leading to a trade war with the *United States*.

America is already riled at European export subsidies. They not only make it more difficult for Third World countries to export farm produce to Europe; *they also edge the United States out of* traditional export markets.

A trade war between Europe and the United States would mainly be at the Federal Republic's expense — and strike at its vital nerve.

The West German state is financially well able to keep its farmers happy, but it cannot afford to allow its industrial exports, the mainstay of the country's *prosperity, to be ruined* as a result of pointless farm subsidies.

Jacques Delors, the French president of the European Community, sensibly aims to reduce CAP expenditure to 50 *per cent of the Brussels budget while* doubling the outlay on regional and structural development.

Sound though this target may be, it cannot be reached without painful in*roads. The North-South divide, the gap* between rich industrial and poor agricultural states, must be reduced if the Twelve are to become a genuine European Community. Anyone in Germany *who views European commitments* as a

Continued on page 2



Israeli Foreign Minister in Bonn

Chancellor Kohl (right) assured Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres at a meeting in Germany that he would "support everything which contributes towards peace in *the Middle East." Peres and Kohl are pictured at Kohl's* private home in Oggersheim. (Photo: dpa)

IN THIS ISSUE


TRANSPORT Page 7
German haullers fear freer European rules will damage their business

BUSINESS Page 8
Embassies lack commercial expertise, say traders

NUCLEAR ENERGY Page 9
Public opinion returns from Chernobyl brink

MEDICINE Page 12
Alternative treatments not just humbug, doctors say

HORIZONS Page 15
The ideal secretary who spied for the Kremlin



■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Bonn, Tirana talk about new links

RHEINISCHER MERKUR

It seems that West Germany and Albania are at last on the brink of establishing commercial and diplomatic ties again. Albania is the only East European country Bonn does not have links with.

German and Albanian diplomats are said in Bonn to be making progress. Commercial contracts have been negotiated and diplomatic ties are in sight.

What kind of a country is Albania? What bilateral ties have there been in the past? Why has it taken so long to restore them?

In 1878 a League to Protect the Rights of the Albanian People was set up Prizren, now in Yugoslavia.

Albania gained independence after the 1912-13 Balkan War. Its first ruler was a German prince, and during the First World War it more than once came close to being partitioned by its neighbours.

After the war it was protected by the League of Nations. A strong man emerged, the young and intelligent Ahmet Bey Zogu. He became President in 1925 and was crowned Zog I, King of the Albanians, in 1928.

Zog sought close ties with Italy, with which Albania signed many treaties and pacts. In April 1939 Italy annexed Albania, which was ruled as a puppet kingdom with Victor Emmanuel of Italy as king. The Germans adopted a similar approach in 1943 when, after the Badoglio putsch in Italy, they took over the "protection" of Albania and granted a new government headed by the highly respected Mehdi Frasheri ostensible sovereignty.

That was a low-water mark in what had previously been cordial German-Albanian relations. Germans had fought alongside the Albanian national hero Skanderbeg against the Turks, and Leibniz, the 18th century German philosopher, was interested in the Albanian language. At the turn of the 19th century German philologists — Thunmann and Xylander — published the first Albanian grammars and textbooks.

By 1900 German scholars such as Hahn, Meyer, Weigand, Jockl and Lambertz had researched Albanian history, archaeology, geography and folklore.

A long succession of German geographers beginning with the "German Strabo," A. F. Büsching, in the mid-18th century, sought to flesh out Albania, a white spot on the map of Europe, with facts and figures.

German geologists probed its mineral resources, especially its high-grade petroleum, during the First World War. German construction companies built roads. The influence of German firms was apparent all over the country — from street lighting in Tirana to Albania's inclusion in the international civil aviation network.

In 1923 the two countries first established diplomatic relations. A trade treaty followed in 1926 and proved to mutual advantage.

The Albanians offered resistance only to their German "protectors" during the Second World War. Partisans loyal to the King, led by Abas Kupi, the patriotic National Front and the 20,000-strong National Liberation Army took arms against the Germans.

The NLA was led by the Communist leader, Enver Hoxha, and operated in close conjunction with Tito's partisans in neighbouring Yugoslavia.

It was clear to all concerned that these ties would grow even closer after the war and that Yugoslavia would "swallow" Albania, as cynically suggested by Stalin.

But the Albanians had their own views and the clash between Stalin and Tito salvaged their independence.

In the late 1950s the Russians were a little too keenly interested in Albania, which is so strategically located in the Adriatic and by the Mediterranean.

Albania broke off relations with the Soviet Union in 1960/61, and after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 Tirana formally withdrew from the Warsaw Pact.

It has since maintained minor-key ties with Eastern Europe amounting to little more than exchanges of good wishes on national holidays.

Tirana established much closer ties with China, but broke them off too once Mao's heirs embarked on their "capitalist" road.

Albania has since stepped up ties with the West, even resuming relations with its arch-enemy Greece in 1971.

It would have been an interesting partner for the Federal Republic too, and the Brandt/Scheel government made approaches in 1969.

But Enver Hoxha had his Foreign Minister coolly reply that Bonn must first pay several billion dollars in reparations.

The exact amount Tirana had in mind was specified to the German embassy in Belgrade in 1975: $2bn plus interest at the dollar's 1938 value.

Bonn was flabbergasted. Even the Soviet Union had made do with roughly $13bn in reparations.

Bonn government officials checked the figures and arrived at a total of $440m at most, payable after a peace treaty by the terms of the 1946 Paris reparations agreement and the 1953 London debt agreement.

These commercial forays into history continued until 1980. Albanian contemporary historians produced one new damages claim after another. German historians briefed them on exchange rates and gold standards.

They also noted that Albania had confiscated German property worth RM1bn at the end of the war.

Then came compliments. Tirana praised Bonn's "positive attitude" toward Albania and stressed that there had been no "hostile acts" toward Albania by Germany since the end of the war.

Before the eighth congress of the Albanian Labour Party in November 1981 Enver Hoxha himself shelved the old demand for billions in reparations.

There were, he said, no insuperable obstacles to the establishment of diplomatic ties with the Federal Republic.

Bonn took action when East Berlin sought to mend fences with Tirana. Talks began between the two countries' Paris embassies and made promising headway.

At the end of 1982 the Albanian government officially classified the state of ties as it saw them.

Trade ties were satisfactory. Disputes of old could be resolved given goodwill and specific moves by West Germany.

Bonn in contrast insisted on clarifying that reparations, if any, could only be discussed once ties had been esta-

Continued on page 3

Weizsäcker makes a state visit to Greece

Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker has made a five-day state visit to Greece. He is the first Bonn President to go there since Theodor Heuss 31 years ago.

President von Weizsäcker was accompanied by his wife, Marianne, and a German delegation including Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Herr Genscher had to return to Germany the next day but he still found time to talk with his Greek opposite number, Karlos Papoulias.

Greek officials recalled with satisfaction that Herr Heuss had chosen Greece as his first official destination for a state visit.

It was a visit that had played a part in helping to heal the wounds of the Second World War and the German occupation.

President von Weizsäcker's programme also amounted to more than a holiday visit. It was a painstakingly planned state visit geared to specific issues.

In Thessaloniki, Greece's "secret capital," he conferred with Greek industrialists and with returned Greeks who had lived and worked in Germany.

Northern Greece is a major economic centre of the country and German firms are committed there. It also accounts for 80 per cent of Greeks who work in Germany — and for nearly 5,000 German women with Greek husbands.

His visit to Samos, an island off the Turkish coast, will have been seen by his hosts as support for Greece's position in the Aegean conflict with Turkey.

Süddeutsche Zeitung

For Herr von Weizsäcker it was a gesture of acknowledgement for the German Archaeological Institute, which has worked on the island for over half a century and recently opened a museum endowed by the Volkswagen Foundation.

The President made it clear in an interview with Greek journalists that he had no intention of allowing himself to be dragged into the quagmire of Graeco-Turkish disputes.

He called on the two countries to hold talks to settle their differences and to accept the UN proposals for a solution to the Cyprus conflict.

He offered the services of the European Community, including the Federal Republic, as an intermediary if [illegible] wanted.

Herr von Weizsäcker expressed similar views on his state visit to Turkey a year ago, making it clear that Germany maintained longstanding cordial relations with both countries and was not prepared to allow either to play one off against the other.

This point recurred in his speech at the dinner held in his honour by President Christos Sartzetakis.

He stressed the close and cordial relations between the German people and the Greek and Turkish peoples, saying he was well aware "that it is not for Germans to offer well-meant advice to a third party."

It was for the Greeks and Turks to arrange neighbourly relations themselves. "In the final analysis," he said, "a solution to the problems can only be reached via agreement and mutual understanding."

He repeated what he had said in Ankara: "May readiness for dialogue, the desire for understanding and the ability to reach a compromise permit as good neighbourly a relationship between the two crucial countries in the East Mediterranean as was established by Venizelos and Ataturk in the early 1930s."

Herr von Weizsäcker, like President Heuss a mere 11 years after the war, visited the Greek national war memorial in Kaissariani, a suburb of Athens.

During the Second World War and the German occupation hundreds of Greek resistance fighters of all political persuasions and from all parts of the countries were executed there.

Kaissariani is seldom visited by tourists.

Carl E. Buchalla

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 24 June 1987)

Continued from page 1

tiresome financial handicap would do well to remember that over 50 per cent of German exports go to European Community countries free of tariffs.

The political benefit members derive from the Community, much though it may lag behind targets, cannot even be quantified. The attraction it exercises on outsiders has grown so immense that more and more potential new members are sounding out their prospects in Brussels.

Many organisations have representatives accredited to the European Community. So do no fewer than 130 states.

Regardless whether the aim of a uniform domestic market envisaged in the Single Europeah Act is achieved by 1992 as planned, no-one wants to miss the boat. The community of free and equal European states has gradually even been acknowledged by those who initially saw the European Community as nothing but an "instrument of domination by capitalist monopolies."

The Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation, Comecon, is keen to establish official ties with the Community, as are smaller Eastern European countries.

Given Soviet criticism of meetings held by Community bodies in West Berlin, the people of Berlin can be grateful for clarification of the fact that the city has formed part of the Community since the Treaty of Rome was signed 30 years ago.

There will be no agreement with Comecon in disregard of West Berlin's interests. This is an issue on which the Community has the greater leverage.

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 28 June 1987)

The German Tribune

Friedrich Reinecke Verlag GmbH, 3-4 Hartwicusstrasse, D-2000 Hamburg 76. Tel. 22 85 1, Telex: 02-14733

Editor-in-chief: Otto Heinz. Editor: Alexander Anthony. English language sub-editor: Simon Burnett — Distribution manager: Georgine Picone

Advertising rates list No 15
Annual subscription DM 45

Printed by CW Niemeyer-Druck, Hameln

Distributed in the USA by: MASS MAILINGS, Inc. 540 West 24th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011

Articles in THE GERMAN TRIBUNE are translated from the original text and published by agreement with leading newspapers in the Federal Republic of Germany.

In all correspondence please quote your subscription number which appears on the wrapper, between asterisks, above your address.

■ DEFENCE

Schmidt idea about joint Franco-German force gathers rapid momentum

Frankfurter Allgemeine

Military cooperation between France and Germany, normally a conference topic for institutes and study groups specialising in foreign affairs, is suddenly preoccupying the French public.

The debate began when former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt made some comments to a Socialist forum in Paris. What he said met with approval from former French Premier Laurent Fabius.

Federal Chancellor Kohl's proposal for a Franco-German brigade has brought headier visions down to earth while making them more graphic.

Military experts are keeping any doubts they may have to themselves. Some Socialist politicians and members of conservative parties have wondered aloud whether the French nuclear deterrent shield ought not to be extended to cover the Federal Republic.

The government has refrained from comment, while only former Gaullist Premier (and Defence Minister) Michel Debré and the Communist have raised objections.

Cooperation proposals are popular. Six out of 10 Frenchmen feel a joint Franco-German unit would be a good idea, and seven out of 10 would welcome a European army.

These are all signs that a defence policy reappraisal has begun in France.

It is somewhat surprising when one recalls that the European Defence Community foundered on French opposition in 1954 when a majority in the National Assembly voted against ratifying the treaty because they were opposed to German rearmament.

Rearmament nonetheless came about within Nato, and the 1963 Franco-German Treaty envisaged cooperation extending to the military sector.

But this provision remained a dead letter, defence cooperation appearing inadvisable despite the confidence built by mutual ties in other sectors.

For one, France had withdrawn from the Nato military command and stressed its independent nuclear deterrent, the *Force de frappe*.

For another, the Federal Republic relied on military protection provided by the United States.

Under President Giscard d'Estaing the French armed forces established closer ties with Nato without making a song and dance about individual, practical moves.

Franco-German cooperation went ahead just as discreetly in practice, with joint manoeuvres periodically organised by the Bundeswehr's logistical staff unit in Fontainebleau, near Paris.

At the same time M. Giscard d'Estaing, bearing Moscow in mind, voiced public doubts as to the usefulness of a new European defence organisation.

At the 39th Franco-German summit, held in Paris on 25 February 1982, President Mitterrand and Chancellor Schmidt agreed to "intensify the exchange of views between the two governments on security issues."

Nine months later Chancellor Kohl, on his visit to Paris on 1 October 1982, reaffirmed this agreement.

A joint commission on security and defence was set up and agreement reached on Foreign and Defence Ministers conferring regularly several times a year. General security policy trends clearly favour this new form of Franco-German cooperation.

First there was the Nato twin-track "missiles and talks" decision, then the deployment of new medium-range US nuclear missiles in Europe.

Later there were France's misgivings about President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative. Now France and Germany must come to terms with the "zero option" and the repercussions of a superpower missile agreement for Europe.

There are other reasons that are not even easily aired in private, let alone suitable for a mention in joint declarations, such as French worries about latent neutralism in Germany and German doubts about France's economic performance and the use of heavy spending on nuclear weapons.

Where France is concerned a defence concept dating back to General de Gaulle's days is at issue. Its mainstay is massive nuclear deterrence.

How can an independent decision on the use of nuclear weapons be reconciled with the interest in survival of neighbours whose territory French nuclear weapons would devastate?

How is the protection of French territory to be reconciled with the wish to lending neighbouring Germany a helping hand in the event of an emergency?

In 1981 Socialist Premier Pierre Mauroy coined in an essay the concept of a common "defence terrain" in Western Europe.

In 1985 Socialist Defence Minister Charles Hernu said, in a speech in Münsingen, that French vital interests could be at stake in the Federal Republic.

Early in 1986, at meetings with Chancellor Kohl in Baden-Baden and Paris, President Mitterrand agreed to hold consultations on the use of nuclear weapons in an emergency, although Germany was not to be entitled to a say in target planning.

In the April 1987 framework law on the armaments programme from 1987 to 1991 France's determination to intervene in Europe side by side with its allies is reaffirmed: "If the survival of the nation is decided at the national border, then its security may be decided at its neighbours' borders."

This formula, which a number of Bonn politicians and officials feel is a little too meagre, originates from Premier Chirac.

A paper on the repercussions of the "zero option" drawn up by a group of retired French military men and diplomats for the UDF, goes a decisive step further.

France, it says, ought to undertake to come to its neighbour's defence if the event of an attack on the eastern border of the Federal Republic.

France has hitherto failed to demonstrate any such readiness to commit itself to "forward defence."

The *Kecker Spatz* (Saucy Sparrow) joint autumn manoeuvres are to practise just such an emergency.

Officials in the Federal Republic feel these exercises are more useful at present than uncertain nuclear guarantees.

Thankmar von Münchhausen

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 25 June 1987)

An isolation that cooperation cannot disguise

Franco-German cooperation on matters of external security is inevitably rich in acts of political symbolism, such as joint arms industry projects, exchanges of staff officers and companies and a binational defence research institute.

But they cannot conceal France's over 20 years of isolation from Nato's nuclear planning and from the pact's operative doctrine of forward defence.

France's independent nuclear deterrent policy has tended to be reinforced by dissonance from Bonn in connection with the "double zero" debate.

France may have given its approval to the Nato position but found it hard to do so, and it did so strictly subject to its *Force de frappe* not being included in arms control talks until the superpowers have halved their strategic nuclear forces.

In France all political parties still abide by the principle that only an independent nuclear potential can ensure a credible nuclear strategy.

In the final analysis this conviction is shared both by "left-wing" critics of Nato's flexible response policy and "right-wing" opponents of the double zero option in the Federal Republic.

None of them is prepared to believe that the United States would be prepared to use strategic weapons to protect Europe's nuclear have-nots.

This policy of nuclear strength — with the strongest strong on his own — contrasts with a slight rapprochement with the Federal Republic on conventional defence.

Premier Chirac recently decided that although France's survival might be decided at the country's border its security could well be decided at its neighbour's borders.

At present this policy of closing ranks, as demanded by the Bonn government, is still at the stage of declarations of intent and of politico-military demonstrations.

Two such demonstrations are the mixed brigade suggested by Chancellor Kohl and the *Kecker Spatz* joint manoeuvres planned for this autumn.

The idea of setting up a joint Franco-German unit several thousand strong is impracticable in the foreseeable future except as a showpiece brigade.

President Mitterrand may have described the unit the Chancellor advocates as a possible "embryo of European defence," but at present it would either have to spend years in gestation or be stillborn.

There is no bilateral command, no joint staffs, no logistical organisation, no standardisation of arms, training and equipment. Not even the principles of military leadership and operative thought are comparable in the French and German armed forces, and without at least some of these prerequisites a joint unit is doomed to failure.

On financial grounds alone it would be irresponsible to set up a brigade without the necessary superstructure — just as it would be irresponsible to set up the superstructure solely for one brigade.

A further possibility would be to combine two French and two German parachute battalions, each roughly corresponding to a British regiment, and call them the 1st Joint Parachute Brigade.

But that too would be only an illusion. Pseudo-mergers of mechanised units would be even harder, but even the paras would continue to be separate units sharing only combined insignia.

The joint exercises to be held in September are less clearly symbolic yet are still largely a show put on by the Chancellor's Office and the Elysée Palace.

In sending in its 20,000-man *Force d'action rapide*, or rapid deployment force, France aims to demonstrate that the FAR is suitable not only for action further afield but also in the defence of Central Europe.

The idea is to take the wind out of the sails of its critics and to demonstrate the rekindled love of Germany as a Western glacis — a love born of necessity.

Bonn so welcomes this demonstration that it is prepared to hold this exercise in place of the customary Nato autumn manoeuvres. Cooperation between a fully mechanised German corps and the light FAR, equipped for airlifting, is hardly in keeping with Nato's General Defensive Plan on which manoeuvres are usually based.

This state of affairs is strongly criticised — internally — by a number of Bundeswehr officers, some of them high-ranking.

They have no objections to holding joint manoeuvres with the French but fear that the combination of such possible causes of friction might deprive the exercises of any military meaning.

Possible friction ranges from difficulty of mutual understanding and differences in tactical and operative leadership to different training standards among conscripts.

The political decision in favour of the manoeuvre forces the military to make even more compromises at the expense of the "closeness to reality" that is the purpose of such exercises.

If the Franco-German brigade and the *Kecker Spatz* manoeuvre are to be included in a catalogue of moves, the manoeuvre will come second and the joint unit third.

What is still lacking in conventional defence is a first step that makes sense both militarily and politically.

Kurt Kister

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 23 June 1987)

Continued from page 2

blished. They are now at arm's length — with a tiny country of just over three million people and trade ties on the decline (from DM127.7m in 1982 to DM85.1m in 1985).

Is Albania an important partner? Since Tirana's break with Peking Albania has presented an opportunity for leeway Bonn must and is sure to use.

If stability in the Balkans and containment of Soviet influence in the region are desirable objectives, then normal ties with Albania are definitely a step in the right direction.

Wolf Oschlies

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 19 June 1987)

■ RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

Protestant conference gives an airing to everything from Aids to Zeitgeist

DIE ZEIT

The 22nd German Protestant Church assembly in Frankfurt was a record-breaking affair: more than 150,000 people came along to the five-day gathering, where 3,000 separate events were held.

The assembly proved all those wrong who had either predicted that it would be too political or — at the other extreme — exaggeratedly pious, "peaceful" and conformist.

Church assemblies have always turned out to be different than expected.

The fundamentalist members of the German Confessional Church, who have boycotted this event for many years, would have done well to come and see the many thousands of young people who attended over one hundred church services in Frankfurt.

The assembly is organised every two years by the laity for the laity. Christians young and old are given the opportunity to discuss the bible or, as in Frankfurt, pray and meditate in the huge "Hall of Silence".

Where else is such devoutness and religious zeal demonstrated with such commitment and in such numbers?

Those who were worried that there would be too much bible-bashing and a return to traditionalist loyalty to the Church were able to witness how tens of thousands of Protestants took part in highly political and strictly matter-of-fact discussions.

Was this kind of interest and this degree of involvement ever shown during party-political or scientific congresses? Church assemblies make many things possible.

The hall of prayer at the trade fair grounds in Frankfurt was overcrowded every day and had to be temporarily closed several times.

Young and old Protestants made their way to the bible-discussion groups very early in the morning. Groups could be seen making their way through the city's streets at the crack of dawn.

The fact that many often took part in discussions that lasted late into the night before seemed to have little effect. They managed the following morning to sit, wide-awake or immersed in thought and taking notes in the spacious halls.

Were these the members of the bibleless and disbelieving society feared by sanctimonious prophets of doom?

People thronged towards the exhibition rooms or to the many discussions, such as one on the topic of disarmament between Saarland premier Oskar Lafontaine (SPD) and the CDU Bundestag member Volker Rühe.

Another interesting discussion was between Otto Reinhold, the Rector of the East Berlin SED's Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences, and ex-bishop Albrecht Schönherr from East Berlin.

Unemployment, the historians' dispute, the long overdue reconciliation with the Soviet Union, Aids, apartheid, the situation of women and the Council of Peace of the World Churches were just some of the topics discussed.

The audience asked questions and agreed or disagreed vociferously on all these issues.

Are these the members of the apathetic society which the prophets of the *Zeitgeist* claim already exists?

Those who have followed the development of these assemblies since the 1950s, their alleged "politicisation" and their steadfast assessments of the bible are no longer dismayed about the fairground atmopshere which often prevails.

Right from the start the church assemblies have been worldly and, in their early years, all-German occasions, an opportunity for an at least brief reunification between Germans from say Leipzig and Munich.

The character of an international meeting place was even more important after the cementation of the division of Germany.

The assemblies gave the faithful at grass roots level a means of pressurising political and church leaders into seeking new answers to the new questions facing society.

Since then the church assemblies have been regarded as a *kind of "evangelical* time check".

Sometimes they have been able to live up to this expectation, on other occasions they were less successful.

A platform was created for dissenters over the years, for example, whereas many political and social objectives were not achieved.

Church assemblies were often tempted to try and achieve too much at once, demanding too much from too many.

Pleasant-sounding words could not alter this fact and many justified demands remained no more than theory.

In Frankfurt, the Social Democrat Premier of North Rhine-Westphalia, Johannes Rau, called upon the "congregation" to "build bridges instead of bridgeheads".

In a plaintive cantata he wrote himself Erhard Eppler described a situation "between the deluge and the rainbow".

Even words of warning, such as those issued by Heinrich Albertz or the provost of Erfurt, Heino Falcke, simply, as so often in the past, died away.

"Will we at long last find firm ground beneath out feet?" (Albertz)

"The church assembly is a celebration. Let us celebrate. We are more *high* than *down.* Dancing is more natural than sorrow." (Falcke)

Both Albertz and Falcke referred to the assembly motto, the words of astonishment spoken by Pontius Pilate on seeing Jesus on his way to the crucifixion.

The hope expressed by the president of the World Federation of Reformed Churches Allan Boesaks from Cape Town that heavenly Jerusalem must already become reality on Earth today remains a hope.

Heaven and Earth are still worlds apart. However, as East German writer Günther de Bruyn emphasised in quotation of his favourite writer Jean Paul, he who loses hope loses all. The various resolutions, whether on the bank connections of the church leaders in the case of South Africa, on compulsory measures to fight Aids in Bavaria or a "women-oriented language in the church assembly presidium" will also have little impact.

Church assemblies have often been a testing ground for new ideas, a duelling floor for opposing and antagonistic views.

Frankfurt was no exception in this respect, and Berlin, the venue of the 23rd church assembly in two years time, will fall in with this tradition.

But what will happen until then? What use is a church assembly to the church if it is not even organised by it or representative of it?

What has taken place during recent years at church assemblies has had little influence on the workings of the Church itself.

More modern and up-to-date ideas have not rejuvenated the "old" institutional framework.

This is all the more surprising since many members of the church "establishment" have been actively involved in the Protestant church assemblies. Church assemblies were always fair-weather events for the Church.

The day-to-day realities *of church life* paint a different picture: *empty churches,* a declining number of christenings and church weddings, and a growing number of people opting out of the religious community.

Not much was said about this side of the coin in Frankfurt. It looks as if both the festive and the day-to-day church communities have come to terms with this situation.

Page 8: Church hits at firms which invest in South Africa.
Page 13: Chemicals, food and farming debated at a conference.

Experience has shown that even the church leaders and chairman lack the ears needed to heed what church assemblies say.

Once again it was young people who "expect more from the church" and "want to know what they should do".

At another stand there was an invitation: "If you want to see a human being please open here!".

Those who accepted found themselves staring at themselves in a mirror and also at those whom they should be helping: the poor, the needy, or those who want to change things for the better.

Church assemblies are often an occasion for self admiration and back-slapping, of saying: look at what we're doing.

And yet there are many contrasting pictures which will stay in the minds of many.

The helper who busily jots down notes during a discussion while the physically and mentally handicapped person he is taking care of lies alongside him.

Or the participation of thousands in the Holy Communion in the Frankfurt sports stadium. Or the girls who silently prayed in the Hall of Silence and cheerfully queued up at a sausage stall a short while later.

Or the young boys who eagerly took down notes during a lecture by the controversial theologian Dorothee Sölle on the "suffering God" and then later in the evening clapped to the rhythms of beat music.

In the words of the president of the church assembly this year, Eleonore von Rotenhan, the gathering was "not just political nor just pious, but above all friendly".

Fortunately, it was a very happy event too.

Dietrich Strothmann

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 26 June 1987)



■ PERSPECTIVE

German identity faces a double dilemma over the wish for reunification

DIE ZEIT

The serious crisis of identity facing West Germans can no longer be denied.

Every historical date which reminds us of the past, whether this is May 8 (end of World War II), June 17 (German Unity Day) or August 13 (the day on which the building of the Berlin Wall began), whirls up the sediment of uncertainty about our future destiny.

We are wedged between a twofold dilemma. On the one hand, the contradiction between the emotionalism of a desire for reunification and political possibilities in the real world; on the other, the unsettled conflict between the objective of German unity and the objective of Western European integration.

Life in this antagonistic straitjacket is gradually wearing us down. We're becoming neurotic.

There is no other explanation for the highly sensitive way some West Germans reacted to a speech in the Bundestag by Professor Fritz Stern, an American historian of German descent.

Referring to the events which took place in East Germany on 17 June, 1953, Stern remarked that "this was no uprising in the name of reunification". Stern is right.

Workers in East Berlin shouted "Get rid of Ulbricht!" and not "We want Adenauer!".

But why belittle the dignity of their action? They made a stand for freedom, not for German unity.

"I come from a Germany which no longer exists and will never exist again," said Stern. Isn't it time that we started appreciating this fact?

Stern added another bitter truth: "Undivided Germany brought indescribable unhappiness upon other peoples and upon itself." Yet another fact we are unwilling to acknowledge?

Or Stern's concern that Germans might be tempted to go back on their "conversion to Europe and reconciliation with the West" at a time which could be described as the "most successful period in Germany's history"?

The recent discussion on the German Question has been marked by signs of a nationalistic neurosis.

The consensus of the advocates of *Realpolitik* is still not at risk, and the overwhelming majority of Germans are still uninterested in any dangerous escapades.

Two thirds of all West Germans would like a united Germany, but only eight per cent believe that this can be achieved within the next 10 years.

The gap between desire and expectation reveals a marked sense of reality. The question is, however, how long can a nation do this kind of psychological splits? It's time we made up our mind one way or the other.

It is not true that all other nations do want German reunification. What we may regard as a pleasant dream is regarded as a nightmare by our neighbours in East and West.

Who really believes that they want a united Germany "because it could also bring its greater influence to bear on peace in their interest too" (a remark made by Walter Scheel in 1978)?

They are already worried about West German hegemony in the economic field. Why should they be convinced "that German unity is the only really effective guarantee for peace in Europe" (Wolfgang Venohr)? Certainly not as a result of their historical experience.

American historian David Calleo goes so far as to maintain that "whenever Germans were united in one state they became a threat to themselves and to their environment".

A reunification of the two Germanies would at any rate bring about the greatest conceivable shift in the balance of power. No-one outside wants to risk that.

But what about the Germans themselves? One line of argument is that the we have learnt our lesson from the catastrophe of defeat in World War II and that no-one has had to worry about us since. Yet can we be that sure of ourselves on this score?

Konrad Adenauer, for example, was not. He was not convinced that the Germans would be able to cope with a position of neutrality, a view reflected in his exclamation "God, what is to become of Germany!".

Indeed, anyone who hears the demands forwarded by German right-wingers, such as "Silesia is ours" or "The Oder-Neisse regions are not forgotten yet", cannot rule out the possibility that the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and East Germany would merely serve as a trailer to a revisionist remake.

Do we seriously want to break away from the moorings found after the war in the Atlantic and European Communities?

And, were Gorbachov to send us a new version of the 1952 Stalin notes, do we really want to fall back on the rider of 28 February, 1957, in which Bonn reserves its right to "re-examine" the Treaty of Rome in the event of German reunification?

Car there be a serious interest in withdrawing from the European Community and setting a national imperative above the goal of European integration?

Up to now, we have not given that much thought to these various implications.

We have deluded ourselves into thinking that a general framework of peace throughout Europe would automatically lead to German reunification and that East Germany would gradually move closer to the Federal Republic of Germany and thus towards the European Community.

We have talked ourselves into believing that, once borders become insignificant, there would be no further obstacles to German unity.

We never thought that we might some day have to choose between our western commitments and our national aspirations.

Almost 440 years have gone by since the division of Germany became a reality.

We should realise today that peace in Europe develops on the basis of the division of Germany rather than on the basis of its reunification.

In answer to our arguments the objection can be raised that unification would become superfluous if borders were to lose their significance.

It now looks as if the time has come to lay down priorities and choose between the dream of a united Germany and the reality of an evolving European Community. Are we willing to risk a renewed crisis of orientation?

During its early years the Federal Republic of Germany viewed reunification as the main guiding principle for its political pursuits.

Since 1969 we have been pursuing a policy of non-reunification for the sake of human beings on both sides. Isn't it time to give this policy the mark of finality?

The words of Wilhelm Liebknecht could serve as a motto: *Einigung, nicht Vereinigung* (Unity, not unification).

Reference is frequently made to Bonn President Richard von Weizsäcker's remark that "the German Question remains open as long as the Brandenburg Gate remains closed".

Let us turn this logic upside down and make it the guiding principle of future *Deutschlandpolitik:* "If the Brandenburg Gate (and the borders between East and West Germany) are opened, the German Question will be closed".

is not necessary for all Germans to live under the roof of one state.

Regardless of respective forms of state organisation, ideological convictions and socio-political systems, however, it is essential that Germans be able to meet each other freely.

The border should be made more passable in both directions. The division should not be regarded as more painful than the relationship between the Germans and Austrians.

If the walls and border fortifications were torn down, border signs would lose their significance.

Just as we West Germans view freedom as much more important than unity we should do the same for the 17 million Germans in East Germany.

Let us place this point high on the agenda for the future: the abandonment of our claim to unity in exchange for the realisation of the claim to freedom by East Germans and the lasting safeguarding of freedom in West Berlin.

This stance is not backed by the prevailing interpretation of the provisions of the West German constitution nor by

Continued on page 11

West Berlin, a thorn in both sides

The very existence of West Berlin is a guarantee that the "German Question" remains open. The city stays free and exudes influence in various ways: all of this is a thorn in the side of the Communist rulers in East Berlin.

East Germany cannot fully consolidate its own existence as long as West Berlin exists. But West Berlin is also a thorn in the side of West German convenience.

The policies of West Germany must take West Berlin into account, and they do, sometimes reluctantly.

If they didn't, the German Question would probably have been, by and large, forgotten.

The corresponding constitutional provisions would have frequently been no more than lifeless letters.

The existence of West Berlin, however, ensures that we do not lose sight of the need to resolve our national problem.

The fundamental decision is still which constitutional context should provide the framework for this solution, freedom or dictatorship.

If West Berlin is the German city with the most pronounced and at the same time representative sense of national, European and Atlantic awareness and belonging (all of which are essential), its policies should first and foremost make sure that the German, European and Atlantic dimensions are viewed in conjunction and that German, European and Atlantic institutions cooperate closely.

In Berlin's eyes any artificial emphasis of differences between them is totally counterproductive and highly dangerous.

Wherever Berlin can bring its influence to bear in national and international circles it should try to unite and pool political forces.

For West Berlin there can never be too much European cooperation and integration.

West Berlin should leave German-German relations up to the Bonn government.

The city's own responsibility is to foster local government contacts with East Berlin.

In both policy fields, however, joint planning between the West Berlin Senate and Bonn is essential to make sure steps are taken which safeguard mutual interests.

West Berlin should concentrate activities on strengthening the influence of the Western world, above all western Europe, in the city's political, economic, sporting, cultural and scientific activities.

An important aspect is the impact in the East.

Any activities which lead to exchanges are particularly important.

Following its 750th anniversary year this year West Berlin will become a "European cultural city" in 1988.


The most meaningful political gestures made during the 750th anniversary celebrations and welcomed by the broad majority of the population were the visits to West Berlin by the French, British and American heads of state.

They were able to overshadow the initial irritations surrounding the plans by West Berlin mayor Eberhard Diepgen to visit anniversary celebrations in East Berlin and by East German leader Erich Honecker to visit celebrations in West Berlin.

By meeting Bonn President Richard von Weizsäcker the allied protecting powers themselves emphatically and "dynamically" reaffirmed the close ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Alexander Schwan

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 26 June 1987)



■ MONEY

Ranks of doubters grow over fiscal reform

The ranks of the doubters are growing: despite the almost daily reassurances by Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg that major fiscal reforms are to go ahead in 1990, many people think they won't be quite as planned.

Herr Stoltenberg says the programme will save taxpayers and business DM44bn in income and corporation tax. The state will lose more than DM20bn but will recoup almost as much again, mainly by scrapping subsidies.

These were coalition election pledges at the beginning of the year, but the more often and the more vociferously Herr Stoltenberg protests, the more doubtful it seems that the coalition parties can bring the reform off.

Baden-Württemberg Premier Lothar Späth, a Christian Democrat, heads the list of doubters. Other sceptics include CDU Mayor Rommel of Stuttgart and SPD Mayor Schmalstieg of Hanover and from SPD Premier Johannes Rau of North Rhine-Westphalia to CDU Premier Ernst Albrecht of Lower Saxony.

Chancellor Kohl may back his Finance Minister but it can hardly be considered definite that the Federal government will succeed in following fine words with action by the year's end.

Yet if the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition fails to go ahead with the fiscal reform it will face its toughest tensile test since it came to power five years ago.

The problem lies mainly in the fact that Herr Späth and Herr Rommel have their facts right. What the coalition put together under pressure of time during the coalition talks in January and February is anything other than a uniform fiscal concept.

Agreement was not reached on what subsidies were to be scrapped to finance the tax cuts. Agreement was not reached on whether tobacco and mineral oil duties and/or value-added tax are to be increased. Agreement was not reached on much, much more.

This uncertainty has now been joined by other risks. Economic growth has failed to live up to the government's expectations; growth forecasts need to be scaled down.

That will lead to revenue shortfalls coupled with higher expenditure: on farm policy, on the Airbus, on steel and shipbuilding.

Economic grounds clearly indicate the advisability of reconsidering the timing and extent of the reform package.

In political terms a reappraisal would be disastrous. Stoltenberg & Co. would be frankly admitting their figures during and after the election campaign had been unreliable.

What good is a reform package that collapses like a house of cards as soon as the merest breeze of chillier economic conditions blows?

Besides, both the Federal government and the Bundesbank are convinced the economy is in a better condition that it is reputed to be.

The additional expenditure that lies ahead has not come like a bolt out of the blue; it could clearly be foreseen at a time when the parties were outdoing each other with their tax cut proposals.

So, as Herr Späth now says, changes in economic framework conditions cannot be blamed for the government's failure to abide by its election campaign promises.

Does that mean the coalition must lunge on regardless? Any attempt to share out the blessings heedless of the revenue shortfall and to wait and see what then happened would inevitably lead to a dramatic increase in the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR).


Herr Stoltenberg, who assumed office with the declared aim of consolidating the budget, would have to try and explain that there were bad, SPD-FDP debts and good, CDU/CSU-FDP debts — clearly a hopeless task.

Besides, the *Länder* and local authorities are not very keen on economising at present. Even Herr Späth in Baden-Württemberg has long abandoned the target of a zero PSBR, which is an economically dubious objective anyway.

Without the support of the *Länder* and the local authorities the Federal government's fiscal reform plans are just a scrap of paper; Bonn alone cannot afford to pay for them. In the long term neither the Christian Democrats nor the Free Democrats can conceal the extent to which employers and employees, home-owners and savers, wealthier or poorer people are going to have to foot the bill of fiscal reforms for all. The battle for benefits and privileges has only just begun. Herr Stoltenberg and the coalition cannot hope to emerge from it unscathed.

Uwe Vorkötter

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 24 June 1987)



The Bundesbank eases limits on private use of the Ecu

The European currency unit, or Ecu, is to be treated in the Federal Republic as an "ordinary" foreign currency, although it isn't recognised as being one.

The Bundesbank's central bank council, meeting in Frankfurt, has decided to amend regulations and permit private use of the Ecu to the same extent as other currencies may be used.

General permission has now been given, in accordance with Paragraph 3 of the Currency Act, for banks to hold Ecu-denominated accounts and to raise certain categories of Ecu loan.

On application the Bundesbank will also authorise use of the Ecu as a unit of account in import and export business.

The Bundesbank had previously been reluctant to allow the Ecu the role of more than a unit of payment and account within the European Community.

The Ecu is an artificial currency and, unlike ordinary currencies, is not issued by a central bank but consists of a basket of European currencies.

As the weighting and market rates of currencies in the basket vary, the Ecu is seen as a kind of index, which is why the Bundesbank has been reluctant to approve of its use.

Indeed, with reference to the ban on indexing liabilities, it has hitherto refused private individuals permission to run up Ecu-denominated debts in the Federal Republic.

The aim of of this ban on indexation was, for one, to uphold creditor interest in price stability and to nip the "inflation mentality" in the bud.

This attitude was widely criticised abroad as restrictive, but capital transaction restrictions apply in most European countries, especially France and Italy.

They too affect Ecu holdings by private individuals and commercial enterprises.

The Bundesbank justifies its change in outlook by saying that it has "taken into account the fact that progress in liberalisation has been made in the European Community and that the Ecu has gained increasing significance in money and capital and import-export transactions in a number of member countries."

Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg told the Central Bank Council early in May that he was in favour of a policy change. He is felt to consider this liberalisation as a German contribution toward European integration.

By meeting other European Community countries half-way in this sector the Federal government can afford to adopt a hard line on other commercial issues, such as Common Agricultural Policy, without laying itself open to accusations of constantly stonewalling.

The decision has been widely welcomed commercially and by politicians. The German Banking Association says it doesn't see price stability in any way jeopardised as a result.

The Confederation of German Industry has expressed regret that the Bundesbank has seen fit to liberalise Ecu transactions without corresponding concessions by other European countries.

Experts feel the move will have no immediate effect of any great significance on economic activities in the Federal Republic.

The purchase of Ecu-denominated loans was already permitted, but interest in them had declined despite higher interest rates than are paid on deutschemark bonds in view of revaluation of the German currency.

Given higher interest rates on Ecu bonds there is little attraction in floating Ecu loans. But the Euro-currency might assume greater significance in financing foreign trade.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 19 June 1987)

Japan's place in world's banking pickle

When the International Monetary Conference, initially a 1950s offshoot of the American Bankers' Association, was first held in the Federal Republic in 1971, US Treasury Secretary "Big John" Connally was the star of Munich.

Then as now, the assembled bankers had horror visions of a collapse of the world trade system and faced substantial transatlantic tension.

That summer President Nixon shocked the world with his unilateral tax on imports as the nucleus of a controversial package of measures. In the 1970s a "Japanese problem" had yet to arise.

Japan may not have been on the official agenda of the mid-June International Monetary Conference in Hamburg, but growing tension in trade and in financial and banking markets with Japan Inc. held pride of place on the unofficial agenda.

Officially, representatives of 109 leading banks met to confer on a reform of the international monetary system, on problems of European integration, on the Third World's debt problems and on settlement risks in international banking.

The reason why Japan was not officially mentioned is self-evident. As long as US banks were able to balance their problem loans to the Third World without making any substantial provision for doubtful debts, Japanese banks had a fairly easy time of it as they fought all over the world for higher market shares in the tailwind of gigantic Japanese current account surpluses and a progressively revalued yen.

In Hamburg four German banks, the Big Three and the Bayerische Vereinsbank, hosted the International Monetary Conference. Japanese banks today lead the field worldwide among the 63 non-American member-banks. Japanese banks now account for nearly one third of international bank assets, as against an 18-per-cent share held by US banks.

Nearly five years after the Latin American debt crisis came to a head, leading US banks, heavily committed in South and Central America, are paving the way to a "market-oriented" solution by writing off bad debts.

As a result the leading Japanese banks, which operate with very low capital cover, are increasingly coming under fire — especially by European banks, which in recent years have set aside substantial reserves in provision for doubtful debts.

In the wake of the increasing pace of integration of national financial and banking markets, there is increasing pressure on banks to ensure adequate capitalisation and provision against risk.

With "innovate financial instruments" backing international loans these provisions are indispensable in global markets, as otherwise competition will be extremely distorted. *Klaus C. Engelen*

(Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf, 22 June 1987)

■ TRANSPORT

German hauliers fear freer European rules will put them out of business

DIE ZEIT

German transport interests fear that liberalised international road haulage regulations within the European Community will result in foreign trucks jamming autobahns all over the country.

European transport ministers have agreed, after being pushed by the European Court of Justice, to liberalise the rules. At present 9,500 trucks hold European Community licences to handle international goods traffic. By 1992 there will be 56,000.

The Germans say that they will be hit by the new agreements because German licence fees and road taxes are higher than anywhere else and the amount of oil tax they pay is also more than most competitor countries.

The fears are that an invasion of foreign trucks will take place and that foreign hauliers will underbid German hauliers.

The Treaty of Rome envisaged a common transport policy in 1957. It is a prerequisite for the proposed common market of 350 million consumers.

The European Commission and the European Parliament have for years made proposals, but member-governments have failed to reach agreement.

Headway was only made when the European Parliament took the Council of Ministers to court for tardiness. In May 1985 the European Court of Justice reprimanded the Transport Ministers for having done nothing to bring about the agreed freedom of services in European transport markets.

The court ruled that many of the quotas and restrictions European road hauliers face were not legal. Freedom of services presupposed equal treatment of domestic and foreign bidders.

Yet large sectors of national and international freight markets in Europe remain closed to unwelcome competition. Only a select band of hauliers is entitled to carry goods across European frontiers.

Under court pressure the European Community heads of government decided in June 1985 to introduce a free market in goods traffic by 1992 at the latest.

Soon afterwards the Transport Ministers agreed that quotas were gradually to be scrapped by 1992. German hauliers are least keen on this idea, being at a multiple disadvantage in competition with hauliers in other European countries.

A German haulier must, for instance, pay DM9,364 a year in road tax for a 38-tonne truck. His Dutch counterpart pays only DM3,270, while French and Italian hauliers pay less than DM1,000.

Danish hauliers pay DM7,500 a year but are rebated 50 per cent of their road tax if the truck plies its trade abroad.

Hauliers were delighted when the weight limit for Common Market juggernauts was increased from 38 to 40 tonnes, but not — in Germany — for long.

They can now carry more goods but their road tax was increased by over DM3,000 a year, the Federal government having forgotten to amend the road tax regulations.

Dutch hauliers again had a better deal. Their road tax is based on unladen weight, which hasn't changed.

German hauliers pay more in oil duties than most of their European competitors: 44 pfennigs per litre. Only British and Irish truckers pay more.

What is more, the Dutch, who see themselves as the road hauliers of Europe, directly subsidise their truckers.

They pay investment bonuses to hauliers who buy new vehicles. Italian hauliers qualify for bonuses when they scrap old vehicles and, naturally, buy new ones.

German hauliers feel they are at a further disadvantage in the statutory length of time drivers can work at a stretch and how often they are required to take a break. These regulations are in principle uniform throughout Europe; in practice it is another matter.

Hans Kreft, of the German Road Hauliers' association, says that in Germany, 42 per cent of drivers who work longer than they are supposed to are penalised; in France only 3 per cent were and in Belgium 1 per cent.

This is yet another reason why he is worried at the prospect of even more foreign truckers on German roads. Road safety is likely to nosedive as a result.

Foreign drivers have not yet been caught out more often than German truckers, says Kurt Trinkaus of the Federal Road Transport Research Establishment, Cologne. "There's little to choose between them," he says.

But with a staff of only 130 inspectors there is a limit to the number of offenders he and his department are likely to catch in road checks. So factory inspectors have taken to checking hauliers' records more often.

They take a careful look at drivers' log books and "spy in the cab" discs. They soon identify the black sheep of the trade: hauliers whose planning is based on the assumption that drivers will work longer hours than the statutory limit.

Comparable checks are not carried out in neighbouring European countries. In Holland the authorities have yet to check the records at all, especially as Dutch truckers spend most of their time on German roads anyway.

"They leave us to do the checking," says Christoph Hinz of the Bonn Transport Ministry.

German inspectors have a sneaking suspicion that Dutch hauliers give their drivers the cash with which to pay fines on the spot.

German hauliers say their Dutch competitors can cut costs by seven per cent solely on the strength of being checked less often.

Small wonder, given this state of affairs, that more and more foreign trucks are seen on German roads. Over one million — 50,000 more than the year before — were registered at the German border in the first three months of 1986.

Most of them are Dutch, but Belgian, French, Austrian and Italian hauliers also find the Federal Republic an attractive market.

Industrial and commercial demand for their services is brisk, the road network is good and road tolls aren't charged.

Nearly a third of road traffic in the European Community originates in the Federal Republic, an industrial stronghold. German hauliers often come off second-best in handling this goods traffic. Foreign hauliers handle roughly two thirds of the transnational total.

German hauliers are now worried they may lose even more business. By 1992, they say, about one third of the German market could be served by foreign truckers.

As their costs are up to 20 per cent lower than those of German firms, foreign hauliers could afford to offer German customers much more attractive rates.

Many of the 52,000 German operators, most of whom are small firms, would then have to call it a day.

Bonn Transport Ministers are anxious to eliminate distortions in competition so as to prevent this fate befalling German hauliers.

Transport Minister Werner Dollinger insisted in the Council of Ministers on derestriction being accompanied by harmonisation of competition.

Derestriction will come as a matter of course in the wake of the European Court ruling. Harmonisation, in contrast, is a political decision that Transport Ministers must first put into practice.

European Community governments face their greatest difficulty in equalising tax burdens; they affect national budgets, which are beyond Community jurisdiction.

In countries where road tax is high, such as the Federal Republic, Finance Ministers are opposed to road tax cuts because of the resulting revenue shortfall.

Yet it would seem pointless to charge a road haulier in, say, Crete the same road tax as a haulier in Hamburg. Expensive road networks need to be financed.

Neighbouring countries are unlikely to abolish road tolls, just as technical regulations and welfare provisions are unlikely to be enforced with equal earnest throughout Europe.

Despite these problems Bonn Transport Ministry officials are satisfied with the trend. "We want to establish a European transport market," says Herr Hinz, "we owe it to German industry to ensure that it comes about."

Existing regulations and red tape tend to push up costs, even more so within the Federal Republic than in international road haulage.

In order to protect the hard-pressed Bundesbahn, the German Federal Railways, road haulage is subject to strict market regulations with limited concessions and prescribed rates that are high by international standards.

That, says Klaus Richter of the Federal Wholesale and Import-Export Trade Association, is a striking competitive disadvantage for German manufacturers.

Many firms have taken to running trucking divisions of their own to cut costs. Ex-works long-distance traffic has increased by 260 per cent over the past 20 years and is now equal in volume to the tonnage carried by road

Continued on page 8

■ BUSINESS

Embassies lack commercial expertise, say traders

DIE WELT

Many West German businessmen are highly critical about the help they receive overseas from their embassies. They complain that diplomats assigned to handle economic affairs often don't even understand questions put to them. Some have the feeling that economic affairs diplomats are in the post simply because it has to be filled by someone.

Most of the criticism comes from medium-sized businesses. One executive from a medium-sized firm said: "The people from the embassy just copy the yellow pages from the telephone book. You can't expect much more from them."

Helmut Aurenz, member of the foreign trade committee of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce, Stuttgart, said: "The most annoying feature is the fast turnover of people dealing with economic affairs at our embassies.

"In business, contacts are all important. It takes time to develop them. I often get the impression that the German economic affairs attaché has only just arrived, so he has no idea about the local situation, or he is just about to go and hardly knows a thing because his mind is fixed on his next post.

"As a businessman I regard their main job is to open doors. I want more precise information about investment possibilities, about whom I should speak to in government or if there are any German-speaking advisers."

When arrangements had been made to discuss commercial matters it should be possible for someone from the embassy to accompany the businessman concerned. Aurenz again: "But more often than not the embassy staff don't even have a car available."

Diplomats counter the criticism by saying that little is known of what information there is available in a wide range of small and medium-sized firms. This information can be obtained from the Foreign Ministry direct or from associated government bodies.

One example of the lack of forethought by one businessman is often quoted. A Baden-Württemberg businessman arrived unannounced and unprepared in an Arab country on a Wednesday evening.

He turned up at the West German embassy the following morning and said that he wanted to have a special appointment with an appropriate government official the next day because he had to fly back to Germany on the Saturday.

Friday is equivalent to the Christian Sunday in the Moslem world. No one works. So he flew back without having achieved a thing. He had spent DM20,000 on a first-class air-ticket and accommodation in a first-class hotel.

When he got back home he complained about a lack of cooperation from the West German embassy.

Another businessman sent a telex to an embassy "instructing" the economic affairs attaché that he should look into this and that and find out what investment possibilities there were for his firm.

The Foreign Ministry official involved said indignantly: "That was not on. We cannot make extravagant enquiries at our expense in a country where we have diplomatic representation just to satisfy the needs of an individual businessman."

He continued: "These people are reluctant to pay out a few hundred deutschemarks for a firm of consultants to get advice before they come to us."

Many representatives from industry arrive at West German embassies abroad without being aware of the existence of the Federal Office for Foreign Trade Information in Cologne.

This office publishes reports from West German diplomatic missions. Information on every country in the world is available at very little cost.

One diplomat said: "We often get the impression that our reports just end up on file."

Businessmen who turn to diplomats with dishonest intentions in mind will find themselves in trouble. For instance one executive wanted to know the name of a government official who could be bribed so that resources from a nature reserve could be used, despite a prohibition to the contrary.

There are obviously misunderstandings and problems on the part of small businessmen as well as by Foreign Ministry officials concerned with economic affairs. The Ministry is eager todo something about it.

This is the conclusion that can be drawn from the speed with which the Foreign Affairs Ministry moved itself over proposals from industry and organised a seminar for 25 of its officials involved in foreign trade at the "Export Academy Baden-Württemberg."

This "crammer course" concentrated exclusively on the tasks of specialists for trade and industry in West German embassies abroad.

Aurenz told the Foreign Office participants in this seminar that took place in Bonn: "I have sold my potting compost in Canada without Foreign Affairs Ministry help."

The seminar was aimed primarily at giving diplomats an insight into the problems and needs of small and medium-sized companies. Representatives from a few medium-sized firms were invited to attend this seminar as lecturers.

At the seminar the Forign Office tried to turn the tables on the businessmen attending.

It was suggested that when businessmen had a complaint about officials they should say what ought to be changed.

The problem has been known for years. There is a lack of industry and trade experts at West German embassies.

When a new region becomes interested in West Germany, for instance the threshold countries of the Far East or the Pacific states, it takes years before the embassies concerned include appropriate staff, if at all.

Only one in seven officials in executive positions have degrees in economics. This deficiency could be made good if 50 per cent of attaché training were devoted to economic matters.

The participants in the week-long economics course in Bonn were officials from the clerical service, that is without university training, who were either working in German embassies for about three years as commerical advisers or who came from the Foreign Ministry and were just about to be posted abroad.

In the wide range of courses for them "economics" was only one of the many subjects given.

These officials, according to insiders, were being primed by Foreign Officer personel planners for posts in Africa. They would be told to go out and get things moving commercially and industrially.

The lecturers thought that they were speaking to economic affairs attaches with some degree of experience.

They took the view that the course could only be useful if the participants already had a good knowledge of economnics.

Helmut Aurenz said he was astonished at answers given to questions in the part of the course dealing with "Development of new markets."

He asked participants how much capital one needed, in their opinion, to establish a medium-sized firm abroad.

He got the answer: 5,000 dollars. The more accurate answer would have been 500,000.

What can be done to improve the alleged "economic ignorance" of West German economic affairs diplomats? It has been suggested that they should spend at least a year in a commercial company.

Aurenz said: "They have to know at least how a deal is concluded." An alternative suggestion is that economic affairs appointments in embassies should be filled by specialists from trade and industry.

As always the Foreign Ministry has been cautious about going along with this solution.

The view is that economic affairs attachés in an embassy should not be seen to be dependent on any one particular firm.

Then there are fears there would be a similar reaction to that aroused by the "social affairs consultants" posted to embasssies, most of them nominated by the trades unions.

Critics regard them as intruders who cause trouble in embassies because they consciously avoid the "espite de corps," conventional among diplomats.

Josef-Thomas Göller

(Die Welt, Bonn, 23 June 1987)

Continued from page 7

hauliers. As there is a legal ban on works trucks carrying freight for third parties, thousands of trucks a day run unladen on German autobahns, unnecessarily congesting the roads and polluting the environment.

Then there are the foreign trucks that aren't allowed to do German domestic runs and usually return empty. The net result is that one truck in three on German roads is empty.

German transport market regulations have still more unlikely repercussions. Domestic freight rates, for instance, are higher than cross-border rates.

It is cheaper to ship goods by road from Utrecht to Nuremberg than from Mainz to Nuremberg, which is only half the distance.

"Companies that pay hauliers for their services cannot be expected to pay through the nose," says Herr Richter.

Rüdiger Jungbluth

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 19 June 1987)

Church hits at firms' South African links

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG

The Protestant Church conference has demanded that West German firms stop supporting the racist Pretoria regime by investing there.

Protesters at the conference in Frankfurt wore yellow scarves portraying in black shackled hands against familiar silhouettes of the headquarters of some major German businesses known to have investments in South Africa.

Church groups and the conference itself have closed their accounts with the Deutsche Bank to denounce the ties West Germany's largest bank has with Pretoria.

For years the annual general meetings of major West German concerns have been disturbed by anti-apartheid demonstrators.

These are all symbolic acts. Their effect is limited. Not a single German company has so far withdrawn from South Africa as a result of them.

But the demonstrations were not futile: commercial institutions including Deutsche Bank and Daimler-Benz felt as a result compelled to make public their motives for remaining in South Africa. They had some interesting things to say.

It is not so easy to answer the question whether the blacks in South Africa would benefit from the withdrawal of foriegn firms as it seemed in the many forums at the Church Conference.

Naturally economic and political stability are closely allied to one another - the political setup preserves the economy intact.

But it must be taken into account that the working and living conditions of the 25,000 blacks employed by West German companies in South Africa are, generally speaking, not so badly off as the population as a whole.

The code of conduct that the European Community has drawn up for European Community companies may well be incomplete but it certainly would contribute to weakening and not strengthening apartheid at the workplace.

It lays down recognition of black trades unions and says there should be no racial discrimination at work.

There is something else that German managers have to think about, can they, should they, just throw their workers out on the streets, jobless?

The call "Out of South Africa" is a simplification and not a sensible solution.

Over the past few months a hundred or so American firms, including General Motors, IBM and Kodak, have sold off their South African subsidiaries. This indicates that South Africa is anything but an attractive location for international groups.

The South African economy is not excempt from the political crisis. Many sectors are in dire straits, less from the pressure of public opinion than from the pressure created by high losses.

For this reason West German firms should reconsider if involvement in South Africa is warranted.

Uwe Vorkötter

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 20 June 1987)

■ NUCLEAR ENERGY

Efforts towards a fail-safe reactor

STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG


The Research and Technology Ministry spends DM100m a year on nuclear reactor safety research. Much of the work is unspectacular. In Mannheim, it has taken five years and DM225m to build a facility where coolant system mishaps in a pressurised-water reactor can be simulated.

Germany now has the largest unit of this kind in the world. Kraftwerk Union (KWU) paid 15 per cent of the construction costs and the Bonn Research Ministry the rest.

A complete coolant system, including pumps for a 1,300-megawatt pressurised-water reactor, has been built in a workshop roughly 100ft tall alongside Mannheim power station.

Parts of the system are merely simulated. The facility is modelled on Grafenrheinfeld, one of 11 pressurised-water reactors operational in Germany.

Since the simulator started running last December initial test runs have been completed. All are intended to show whether emergency coolant systems would be adequate if the primary cycle in the radioactive reactor core breaks down. If it did, the core would overheat. Emergency coolant pumped in from above will evaporate, generating counter-pressure that might, at least for a while, prevent enough emergency coolant from reaching the core.



Sounding out safety margins . . . the nuclear breakdown research plant in Mannheim. (Photo: KWU)

The consequences would be disastrous. The reactor core might melt down and release radioactivity — as in Chernobyl. To ensure that this doesn't happen even experimentally in Mannheim the test facility does not use radioactive components.

The simulator reactor does not have a "hot" core; its heat is simulated with assistance from the adjoining power station, as is the breakdown in the coolant circuit.

Before each test the power station fills an enormous tank with hot steam that is fed to the simulated pressurised container at up to 750 kilograms per second, simulating the thermal rating of the core.

Forty tonnes of steam are available for each test run. Thirty experiments are planned, the series being due for completion the year after next.

Each trial takes only a few minutes but two years are needed for preparations and to evaluate the mass of data fed to a full-sized computer along 1,200 data lines.

The results of the initial tests have been much as expected by KWU, GRS, Brown-Boveri Reaktorbau and Munich and Hanover University research staff.

The core of the pressurised-water reactor was heated to no more than 600° C due to the input of emergency coolant. Damage to the fuel rod casing is unlikely at temperatures of less than 1,200° C.

Temperatures were measured by readings of steam current and coolant flow at the upper rod retaining plate, which — as the name implies — keeps fuel rods in place.

This location accounts for somewhat baffling name of the entire facility. The simulator is called an upper plenum test facility — a reference to the upper sector of the pressurised container.

The only surprising fact in connection with the reassuring findings of the first Mannheim trials is that no-one was expecting any other result.

KWU and GRS spokesmen strongly refute any insinuation that the investment has been made because they were in any way doubtful about the performance of coolant systems in German pressurised-water reactors.

Project manager Peter J. Schally stresses that the objective is merely to "sound out safety margins" — and quantify them. Safety margins themselves are expected as a matter of course to be sufficient. The UPTF, or upper plenum test facility, is the West German contribution toward an international reactor safety research programme.

German, Japanese and US scientists are jointly working on what will happen in a nuclear reactor in the event of a serious loss of coolant, up to and including the smallest details of flow and heat trends.

The findings will show whether computer simulation of reactor accidents is based on accurate figures and arrives at accurate results.

In the event of a genuine accident differences between computer estimates and what actually happens could have catastrophic repercussions.

Rainer Klüting

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 20 June 1987)

Public opinion returns from Chernobyl brink

A little over a year after Chernobyl, German public opinion is readier to accept nuclear power than it was six months ago, says an Allensbach poll.

Last December only 19 per cent of West Germans polled approved of the long-term use of atomic energy; now 26 per cent do.

Together with a further 37 per cent who favour a gradual phase-out (over a period of decades), 58 per cent of Germans polled are in favour of the further use of nuclear power.

Allensbach chief executive Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and project director Renate Koecher said it was wrong to classify everyone who favoured a phase-out as an opponent of nuclear power.

Seven per cent favoured an immediate ban (and shutdown of nuclear power stations), as against nine per cent in December 1986.

Twenty-one per cent favoured a phase-out over four to five years, as against 29 per cent last December.

Those who favoured a phase-out over several decades in effect accepted the use of nuclear power for the rest of their lives, so they could hardly be classified as nuclear power opponents.

Besides, 70 per cent of Germans polled said they expected nuclear power to meet most of the country's power requirements for the next 20 to 30 years.

The poll, of 2,156 people, was carried out between 23 March and 2 April 1987.

On balance the findings showed, Frau Noelle-Neumann said, that it was wrong to assume that a majority of Germans were opposed to nuclear power.

That must not be taken to mean that Chernobyl had failed to make a lasting mark on public opinion. The Soviet reactor accident had triggered a "reality shock." The barely conceivable super-disaster had actually happened. Fact had outstripped fiction. People had stopped for a sober reappraisal of all the accoutrements of modern living.

Frau Noelle-Neumann and many other speakers at the three-day Karlsruhe conference reminded research scientists and the public that they must take an active part in the debate.

Hamburger Abendblatt

Speech or silence were crucially important for public opinion, she said. It was fundamentally wrong to reason that "most people are against it and I am in favour, so I would do better to keep my views to myself."


The poll findings indicate that theories expounded by self-proclaimed and often ignorant "critics" had often gone uncontradicted, leaving public opinion feeling most unsure of itself.

Even experts who had spent decades working in their chosen field were implied to be vitally interested in a specific line of argument and thus lacking in credibility.

The assembled experts laughed, either incredulously or in despair, on being told by Frau Noelle-Neumann that only 39 per cent of those questioned believed what the experts had to say on security issues, whereas 53 per cent believed what they were told on TV.

Hans J. Elwenspoek

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 5 June 1987)



■ EXHIBITIONS

Documenta: intellectual content without obvious commitment

Süddeutsche Zeitung

The 8th *documenta* exhibition of contemporary art opened in Kassel on 12 June. It is no longer called the "Museum for one hundred days" but described as an *international exhibition of* contemporary art. This self-appraisal underlines what is inevitably expected of this event that takes place every five years and is only occasionally disappointing.

Documenta is like a magnet for the art world, more important than the Venice Biennale, because it is less frequent. For this reason it can act as a barometer for change in contemporary art.

A visit to *documenta* in Kassel provides not only a special artistic spectacle but also a review of the current position in contemporary art.

The Kassel exhibition arouses considerable international curiosity about the content's of the 8th *documenta*. This public has taken delight in the whole series of exhibitions in Kassel.

It is hard to believe that it has gone from strength to strength since its inspired beginnings and the adventurous receptiveness of Arnold Bodes for all things new, up to the present event, despite the changing directors and teams that have guided *documenta's* fortunes. In all these developments there has never been any question that *documenta* would not survive.

A first glance at this year's *documenta* shows that it is again enormous in size and impressive in intellectual content.

Because of the avoidance of any risky concepts, this year's event is somethinhg of a re-run of previous exhibitions.

The 1987 *documenta* offers a mixture of the contemporary and the ordinary, five years after the highly individual 1982 event when about a dozen artists of considerable artistic achievement emerged.

If the last *documenta* had an improvised air about it the 1987 event gives a view of the variety of current art without making any obvious commitments.

Documenta 8 is made up of an enormous quantity of things. It ladles out examples of new impulses of all kinds in contemporary art, but remains aloof from trends of all sorts.

It gives young artists, some of them quite unknown, a chance to exhibit, but they are inevitably overshadowed by the tried and tested *documenta* artists.

The exhibits in Kassel's Fridericianum give an impressionistic picture nevertheless. The Fridericianum is now the only gallery available for — documenta after the cancellation of the *Neue Galerie* as one of the venues. The *Orangerie* has been reserved mainly for design and architecture.

The exterior of the Fridericianum has been done up but the interior has been done to death over the past few years. The central stairway has been removed and small, divided rooms make it impossible to display the exhibition in a meaningful manner.

To save what cannot be saved — documenta designer Nikolic has throught up a second, continuous wall system that should have given the exhibition a degree of continuity but it does not. These cosmetic measures give the exhibition a sense of insecurity, which could be regarded as a dramatic effect. The claustrophobic conditions of the Fridericianum are increased, which goes to making the art more interesting.

The great variety, deployed to surprise the public, seems to be the driving force behind this year's *documenta*.

It shows that contemporary art is more interesting than it ever was, that it is concerned about the world and includes arrangements of exhibits metaphorically pregnant with significance and painters of a philosophical turn of mind.

Documenta 8 is on the lookout for explosive meaning. The range of exhibits extends from Robert Morris's monstrous tableau of the end of the world to the new thematic approaches by Anselm Kiefer.

Klaus von Bruch seems to subject "Coventry" to a missile attack in his work.

Ambients such as Terry Allen's "China Night" with an Indian barracks behind barbed-wire appeals to the traditions of Kienholz, even if less placating towards the social conscience.

The New York artists' group "Group Material" provides criticism of civilisation with ironic collections of quotes whose production in Kassel, as a form of superstructure, draws on Kafka's novel *The Castle*.

There is a continuous flow of the theatrical in the works done for this year's exhibition. Anthony Gormley's naked casts of the human form are arranged to dramatic effect as are Leon Golub's pictures of torture, picture protests of the racial terror in South Africa.


Hans Haacke's sculptures using the Deutsche Bank logo provide a prelude to this political aspect of the exhibition as does the Mercedes star in a burial photograph from South Africa.

This image of West German commercial connections in South Africa is examined by show texts that are close to the exhibits. The final word on the advertising that Haacke has documented reads: "There are customers that expect more than just a friendly smile from a bank." Does *documenta 8* have a political message? It includes any number of examples of engagement that have a specific direction. It shows that some artists, such as Jenny Holzer or Barbara Kruger, are seeking language and images that will have an effect on the public at large. Thankfully *documenta 8* presents few worn-out examples of searching, reflective dispute using art as a means of communication. But Zoi Goldstein takes up the themes of the art of the Russian Revolution using sculptural inventions and Joseph Nechvatal produced terrifying robot pictures from computer technology.

Ian Hamilton Finlay's *Blick auf den Tempel.* (Photo: AP)

The organisers show they are not particularly unnerved by public criticism. They prefer to present a mass of art works in the belief that this will please the public.

There were light and sweet contributions such as Robert Longo's pictorial and sculptural groups "All' ihr Zombies" which has a wide appeal, or Giuseppe Penone's ceramic pots with plants creating a "Landschaft mit vier vegetabilen Gebärden." *documenta* is not lacking in items of entertainment value. Richard Baquié who sawed up an old Plymouth automobile into four parts and re-engined the nostalgic piece, "Amore mio," for a fantasy trip, brightened things up. In the area between art and design in the *Orangerie* there is a lot that is either knowingly or involuntarily comical. Despite the narrow labyrinthine passages that *documenta* director Manfred Scheckenburger has used in the lay-out of the exhibits the exhibition does not have a unity. The real emphasis is to be found mainly in the hermetically-sealed off art rooms, if the visitor disregards the guide that links the exhibition rooms in Gerhard Richter's guide. Gerhard Merz created for Kassel an impressive ambient entitled "Vittoria del Sole" and Fabrizio Plessi had a fine opportunity to create a monumental video installation in the *Orangerie*.



The late Joseph Beuys' *Blitzschlag mit Lichtschein auf Hirsch.* (Photo: Monika Nikolic)

As was shown recently at the Centre Pompidou in Paris, the most outstanding contributions to this *documenta* came from the deceased Joseph Beuys. The central work of this exhibition is his *Blitzschlag mit Lichtschein auf Hirsch.*

Kassel has said goodbye to utopia with the departure of Beuys. The stones for his 7,000 oak-trees have been cleared away. At the opening of *documenta* Eva Beuys planted the last tree. This time round the park in front of the Fridericianum is no longer part of *documenta*.

The new sculptures on the Auwiese are mainly fragmentary. Ian Hamilton Finlay's series of four guillotines, entitled "Blick aud dem Tempel," seemonly a symbolic character.

Under the guillotines the perspective stretches to the baroque *pavilion* in the background of the park. This is a backward glance to tradition, which is why outsider Finlay was invited to Kassel.


International discussion about public sculpture was taken up in Kassel along the lines of "furnishing a city with sculptures." Scott Burton supplied an "Ottomane," a round seat made of stone with plants at its centre, but which was rather unfortunately placed in the middle of the Auwiese. For the first time an architectural section was included in *documenta*. Here are displayed proposals for the "ideal museum."

The idea is a marvellous opportunity for artistically-ambitious artists to paraphrase, a compromise with reverence by the supporters of the "Post Moderns" who are no longer talked about in *documenta*.

There is a little of everything — which is the most striking characteristic of *documenta 8*, trying to be, above all, pleasing to the public.

Laszlo Glozer

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 13 June 1987)



■ THE ARTS

Award-winning Broadway comedy opens in Berlin

Süddeutsche Zeitung

Herb Gardner's Broadway comedy *I'm not Rappaport* has opened in Berlin's Schloss Park Theatre with Bernhard Minetti in the main role.

In it, the 82-year-old Minetti is not his usual intolerable know-all self, the ossified grumbler, the nasty old man who tyrannises the world around him.

Here he is a normal human being, lovable, warm-hearted, a fishy grand-father who smokes a joint and helps the weak.

The play was awarded a Tony last year. This German première production is guardedly directed by Klaus André.

Bernd Damovsky's sets with bare trees and the arch of a bridge in the background were a treat for the eye, and they do not distract from the man and his antics.

Minetti, playing the part of Nat Moyer, the good man from New York's Central Park, dominates every scene.

At one time Moyer says that he is a lawyer, then he mimicks a mafia killer.

He has a thousand disguises and assumed names, and hundreds of horror stories up his sleeve to stop crooks or relations from pestering him.

He is a liar on a grand scale. He changes his identity as often as he changes his underwear.

On any number of fronts he fights against injustice. He faces up to the world boldly whether it's a matter of the price of lamb or the threatened dismissal of janitor Midge who shares a park bench with him.

Midge is sometimes irritating and sometimes a fascinating sparring partner in the play, that is so relaxed and full of laughs that it is easy to overlook its malice and distortions.

The production has no time for social details or background. Gardner's apparently superficial comedy is full of political allusions that cannot be translated from the realities of Manhattan to the Streglitz district of Berlin. You get the impression that the Schloss Park Theatre did not even want to transplant *Rappaport* to Berlin.

Entrepreneurial lack of consideration is demonstrated in Midge's case, the old, black janitor, who might lose his job and home because it is planned to develop owner-occupier flats in the block where he works. Joachim Bliese, an intelligent actor, is made-up to look like an opera Othello. In this part he has to play an intellectually awkward, intimidated Uncle Tom. One gets the impression that the part is contrary to his nature. Then the chairman of the residents association, played by Thomas Schendel, is totally unaware of the danger he is running when he brings Midge bad news. In this production his racism is neatly played down.

The smaller the role, the more slipshod the direction. Alexander Waechter's Dealer came marching along as harmless as a sausage-seller. This part was also an outright failure.

The evening belonged to Minetti. Minetti, the legend, shone. But the glow deceived. In his grand feel for the comic he overplayed the part. He did not penetrate to the essentials. The old man is a Jew, Nat Moyer. Could he be an emigrant?

The passages in which Moyer tells of his political activities are cut in this German version.

"The triumph of the proletariat, a workers' democracy, these ideas are still valid and wonderful, these ideas continue to live, they are better than the people who stand up for them," he says at one point.

Elsewhere he tells of a woman, who speaks Yiddish and who gases herself.

Bernd Samland's translation does not bring out Nat Moyer's identity fully, an identity that Moyer himself blurs.

Images afloat . . . film being shown on the Binnenalster during the Hamburg festival. See story below. (Photo: Felix Borkenau)

His "deep disguise," which is how describes his dyed-in-the-wool habit of escape into incognitos, functions with a perfection in the Schloss Park Theatre production that startlingly alters the text.

The public does not have any unpleasant memories to overcome. The Jew aspect is suppressed and the performance remains purely entertaining.

Jewish comedian Judd Hirsch played the part on Broadway. Minetti misses out all feeling for the historical background. The audience can only guess at Nat's complex character.

Minetti gives a great performance — but in the end it comes through by the concealment of the realities.

The laughter is rather muted, though, because there are questions which could be put about whether the nature of this past really is apposite for this actor.

Rüdiger Schaper

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 16 June 1987)

High hopes for low-budget films

Low-budget films were once the wallflowers of the cinema industry. They took their place in the shadows while the big-budget American productions reaped the rewards.

But this seems to be changing. Many small-budget films are both commercial and artistic successes. They are making money and winnings awards.

Hark Bohm's *Der kleine Staatsanwalt*, is a big success in cinemas all over West Germany. It was financed by the Hamburger Filmhaus. *Down by Law* by Derek Jarman, from Britain, has become a kind of cult film.

Low-budget films honoured at the Berlin festival include *Der Tod des Empedokles* by Jean-Marie Straub and Peter Watkins' *The Journey*.

Others, such as Peter Krieg's exposé of the myth of the nation, *Vaters Land* or *40 m2 Deutschland* by Tevfik Basser, have been selected by a jury of the Protestant Church as films of the month. (Many of these films were shown in Frankfurt cinemas during the Church Conference.) They were all there to be seen again at the 2nd European Low-Budget Film Forum in Hamburg at the beginning of June.

Crowds turned out for this year's festival and high standards were demanded, to the surprise of Dieter Kosslick, director of the Hamburger Filmbüros, founded in 1979.

He is looking forward to the next Forum, which will undoubtedly take place. It makes the Hamburg summer season that much more attractive.

The *Kino im Fluß*, the giant screen that was set up in the middle of Hamburg's inner Alster Lake, attracted crowds of cinéastes and passers-by every evening. Cinemagoers got their money's worth in the film programme. New and old productions by Danish director Lars von Trier could be seen as well as films by the Spaniard Pedro Almodovar and *Der Al Capone vom Donaumoos* by the 26-year-old Munich director Oliver Herbrich. There were also opportunities to discuss films with film-makers and get to know them. The two world premières were also worth taking notice of: *Das falsche Wort* by Katrin Seybold, a documentary about the extermnination of gypsies during the Third Reich, but primarily about the shameful refusal of the Bonn government, in countless law cases, to pay them any compensation. It is to be shown on television.

The second film was the unusual *Zjock* by Dutch director Eric van Zuylen. Two treatises by the Soviet psychologist Luria form its basis.

Its action contrasts the "memory acrobat" Salomon and a young man who lost his memory in the war.

The *Kino im Fluß* is obviously an expression of disapproval or even a threat against the policies of Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann, who is supposed to promote films but who in most places and at most times is not thought of in flattering terms.

The success of the Low-Budget Film Forum cannot obscure the difficulties that some films have in getting screened.

In workshops producers, distributors, directors and actors sought for means of preserving the threatened art of the film. They call for "national identity as opposed to international markets," and "Save the cinema." They talk of the new media and co-productions.

Their aim is to stop being defensive and find ways of strengthening the cinema as a focus of interest in local communities.

One thing, however, came out of the Low-Budget Film Forum. Insiders pressing for better, independent support for the film as an art form can achieve little on their own. They need the help of those for whom films are made.

Judging by the Forum there seems to be increasing public interest in these films as opposed to Hollywood productions.

One of the slogans made great play of at the Forum was: "Good films for little cash." Another one could have been: Sophisticated films for a sophisticated public. But that could be a like saying that the egg laid the hen first.

Angelika Ohland

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 21 June 1987)

Continued from page 5

the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Basic Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and East Germany signed in 1972.

However, should we cling desperately to unattainable constitutional objectives if their renunciation means a fundamental change in German-German relations? Insisting on a common statehood only leads to divisive acts of defiance, whereas a more accommodating approach could improve the basis of day-to-day relations.

Regardless of the preamble to the Basic Law, our political aim must be to create a situation in which reunification is no longer necessary.

In such an event the Basic Law could be amended accordingly.

Let us try and find courage for such a policy. It would serve the interests of the people, especially in East Germany.

It would rid us of the reputation of being unreliable as well as of the problem of orientation. The dilemma of a choice between western integration and national objectives would then be superfluous.

Such a policy would also allow us to regain the initiative rather than nervously await possible offers from the Kremlin, to take the lever of change into our own hands.

The history of the Germans in the 19th century ran from cosmopolitanism to the nation-state. This was a tragic development. Do we want to experience it again?

As Friedrich Schiller wrote 190 years ago, the "German Reich and the German nation are two different things altogether".

"German dignity . . . lives in the culture and character of a nation, irrespective of its political fate".

Let us make sure that we can say this with our heads held high in a peacefully divided Germany.

Theo Sommer

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 26 June 1987)

■ MEDICINE

Alternative treatments 'not just humbug', doctors say

Rheumatism is the generic term for a variety of complaints of which arthrosis, or wear and tear of the joints, is probably the most frequent, the most inflammation-prone and, as a rule, the most serious.

It is still not known exactly what causes rheumatic inflammation of the joints, so its causes can't be treated.

Conventional treatment — physiotherapy, medication and surgery — can merely alleviate the symptoms and, at best, prevent further deterioration in the patient's condition.

In about 10 per cent of cases, chronic polyarthritis leads to total disablement, and many patients have to come to terms with disability and reductions in their quality of life.

So classic forms of treatment are unsatisfactory. What is more, especially where medicines are concerned, they are not without risk. That is probably the main reason why more rheumatism patients than sufferers from any other complaint give alternative medicine a try.

Conventional doctors call non-medical practitioners outsiders, but patients often hope that what are also called "natural" methods will help them in what is frequently an impossible situation without leaving them at the mercy of harmful side-effects.

DER TAGESSPIEGEL

Representatives of conventional and other branches of medicine conferred and debated effects and side-effects at the 36th German Medical Congress in Berlin.

One conclusion they reached was that unconventional approaches couldn't work wonders.

They also agreed that this category included both treatments that must be taken seriously and others that could be dismissed as humbug. Alternative medicine runs risks too.

The slighter the genuine prospect of a cure (of whatever complaint), the more often patients consult outsiders, said Franz Rainer of Graz University.

One diabetic in four has recourse to alternative medicine, for instance, and nearly 60 per cent of tumour patients.

The figures for diseases that can readily be treated by conventional means are much lower.

Most patients do not opt solely for nature cures, Dr Rainer said. They try them alongside conventional treatments.

Well over 50 per cent of people suffering from chronic polyarthritis try alternative approaches, as against only 20 per cent [illegible] varieties of rheumatism, surveys show.

The alternatives most frequently tried out are acupuncture, homoeopathy, non-medical cures and the more obscure ideas such as reflex zone massage.

Another popular option is to consult a chiropractitioner or non-medical practitioner.

Nearly all patients questioned said they set great store by alternative medicine, but after treatment only a little over one in four still felt alternative medicine was a good idea.

Only eight per cent of people who were expecting great strides beforehand said afterward that outsider treatment had been successful.

Patients who had tried it out were most appreciative of the homoeopathic approach.

Dr Rainer stressed, however, that patients did not consult outsiders entirely of their own volition. Some were virtually driven into their arms by conventional doctors.

Many advocates of alternative medicine took more time with patients and paid more attention to their problems and requirements than conventional practitioners.

Patients with chronic polyarthritis were particularly keen to play an active part in their treatment because they well knew how important this was for the course of the complaint.

They often forced doctors into a passive role. Dr Rainer also mentioned the exaggerated hopes prompted by mass media coverage of and advertising by outsiders.

Professor Martin Franke, a leading rheumatologist and former head of Baden-Baden rheumatism clinic, said misuse of medicine also led to disappointment with conventional treatment.

Basic drugs that eased the pain and delayed the progress of chronic polyarthritis were often prescribed too late. The non-steroid anti-rheumatic drugs usually prescribed impeded inflammation but in some cases had serious undesirable side-effects.

Doctors prescribed them too often, for too long and in wrong doses for too many patients. Another mistake was to prescribe them as pain-killers.

They were not particularly effective as pain-killers, being mainly useful in impeding inflammation.

Above all, Professor Franke said, the risks entailed in treating rheumatic complaints with drugs could only be justified when their benefits were backed by physiotherapy.

In point of fact, he said, quoting a scientific survey, 50 per cent of patients with chronic polyarthritis were given no physiotherapy, only drugs.

Yet physiotherapy, which includes cold and heat treatment, electrotherapy, gymnastics and baths, had the longest tradition in treating patients with rheumatic inflammation.

They were, he said, in a borderline zone midway between modern medicine and nature cures.

Professor Christian Mucha of Hanover medical college said they were most effective — when used in sufficient quantity and in the right manner.

Dietary treatment also helped some patients, said Hellmut Lützner, chief surgeon at a diet clinic.

Metabolic upsets usually played a part in rheumatic complaints. There was no specific diet for rheumatics, but a change in eating habits could do everyone good, not just the sick.

The progress of rheumatic diseases could be favourably influenced, Dr Lützner said, especially after a zero diet for — on average — about 20 days.

Fasting should only be attempted under medical supervision, however, and preferably in a special clinic.

The debate revealed, however, that the validity of such findings was limited because it was extremely difficult to distinguish between the effect of fasting and spontaneous, but temporary, improvements.

Conventional doctors did not dispute the value of a balanced diet, but they warned against making an ideology out of it and depriving sick patients of one of their few pleasures in life.

Representatives of the two "schools" differed much more seriously on the various nature cures outlined and advocated by Dr Sigrid Das from Berlin.

They included colonic cleansing, elimination of inflammation foci, the use of herbal and homoeopathic drugs and neural therapy and symbiotic control.

Rheumatism, like any other complaint, could only be treated, she said, by setting right the basic regulatory system.

Specialists strongly objected to some of the procedures she proposed. Some

Continued on page 13

Passive smokers 'entitled to damages'

Passive smokers, or people who are forced to inhale other people's tobacco fumes, are entitled to damages, says a leading doctor.

Dr Nöldner, business manager of the Hartmannbund, the general practitioners' association, made this claim in an interview with the Cologne newspaper *Express*.

It was, he said, a proven fact that smoking increased the risk of cancer twentyfold "regardless whether you smoke 15 cigarettes a day or are forced to inhale the fumes of tobacco smoked by your neighbour."

Both the medical and the legal profession had lately come round to the view that "passive smoking" constituted active bodily harm. That meant the non-smoker could claim damages from the smoker. He expected there to be an avalanche of court claims.

People who suffered from smokers at work stood a fair chance of gaining a court order instructing their employer to find them somewhere to work where they would not be exposed to cigarette and tobacco smoke.

Dr Nöldner said his association expected the state to lend the individual citizen greater support and no longer allow itself to be "corrupted by industry."

The state had so far stalled on any kind of restriction on advertising for tobacco and alcohol because it was afraid of the effect an advertising ban might have on tax revenue. Bans ought, however, to be imposed at least for sports meetings and at events that mainly appealed to young people.

dpa

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 1 June 1987)

Aids discovery

The Aids virus has been identified in mucous membrane in the mouth by research staff of the dental faculty at the Free University, Berlin.

It is the first time the virus has been identified in solid tissue as opposed to body fluids such as blood, saliva or sperm.

Mucous membrane in the mouth seems to be a particularly large reservoir for Aids-infected cells.

Whether mouth-to-mouth contact is particularly infectious is another matter.

Saliva has so far been found to swiftly inactivate the Aids virus.

(Welt am Sonntag, Hamburg, 14 June 1987)

Test for cancer

Siemens of Munich and doctors at the Harvard Medical School have joined forces to develop a blood test to diagnose cancer.

Announcing details of the research and licence agreement, Siemens said a team of Harvard doctors led by Eric T. Fossel had devised a *blood test* that could crucially improve *cancer* checks.

The reaction to magnetic stimulation by certain fatty substances in blood plasma, lipoproteins, can be illustrated in the form of a so-called magnetic resonance spectrum.

This spectrum has been found by the Harvard medics to indicate the possible existence of a malignant tumour in the patient's body.

Blood samples taken from cancer patients show characteristic changes in the spectrum when compared with those of blood samples taken from healthy people.

dpa

(Mannheimer Morgen, 11 June 1987)

Pill warning

Women who plan to use oral contraceptives are advised by gynaecologists to take regular checks for cholesterin, or blood fat.

This recommendation was given at a Heidelberg congress on contraception. Women with normal cholesterin counts who took the Pill could find their blood fat levels had increased.

The cholesterin count is a risk factor in connection with heart and circulatory complaints. When the count is high women ought to stop taking the Pill immediately.

Women whose cholesterin count was on the borderline ought to have it checked every six months.

dpa

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne, 16 June 1987)

Advantages of not eating meat

Vegetarians are ill less often than non-vegetarians. They run a 70-per-cent lower risk of heart trouble and are also less likely to contract cancer.

This statement was made by Professor Helmut Rottka of the Federal Health Office, Berlin, at a nutrition and dietary medicine seminar in Freiburg.

He was quoting the findings of a survey comparing the health value of a vegetarian diet (but one including eggs and dairy products) and a diet based mainly on meat and fish.

The survey also showed why vegetarians were often in better health. They have much lower blood pressures and blood fat counts than meat-eaters.

High blood pressure and a high fat level in the blood are widely agreed to be the main risk factors in connection with heart complaints.

Vegetarians are usually better at keeping their weight under control than people who also eat meat. On average they weigh up to six kilograms (over 13lb) less than meat-eaters of the same height.

At present 0.8 per cent of people in the Federal Republic of Germany are vegetarians.

(Welt am Sonntag, Hamburg, 7 June 1987)

■ THE ENVIRONMENT

Chemicals, food and farming debated at Protestant Church conference

The platform debate on "Food, Chemicals, Farming: At Odds With Nature" was one of many highlights at this year's *Kirchentag*, or Protestant Church assembly, in Frankfurt.

Ecologists, chemical industry spokesmen and scientists shared a common concern but differed — as might be expected — on both the state of the environment and the outlook for it.

Gerhard Waitz of Hoechst, one of Germany's Big Three chemicals companies and a leading fertiliser and pesticide manufacturer, was critical of his audience in Hall 5 at the trade fair grounds and exhibition centre, the *Kirchentag* venue.

They were, he said, lacking in readiness to forgive. Every sinner ought to be given an opportunity to repent and make amends.

The really toxic chemicals that were used for decades to spray crops in the name of the Green Revolution — until they fell into disrepute — were definitely no longer manufactured.

Leading German chemical companies could make this claim with a clear conscience, he told 5,000 ecologically concerned Christians.

Overseas subsidiaries had also, despite rumours to the contrary, long been instructed to steer a wide berth of toxins such as the pesticide Lindan.

Herr Waitz staunchly and unconcernedly countered a strong undertone of

Frankfurter Rundschau

scepticism, drawing a surprising comparison between conventional and ecological farming.

Conventional agriculture aimed for the highest yields at the lowest cost with as little manpower and as much machinery and equipment as possible.

Ecological agriculture largely dispensed with mineral fertiliser and so-called plant protectives for the sake of crop production in a self-contained system.

Both, Herr Waitz said, interfered with nature. All farmers did. Just as all farmers gave priority to crop protection: both when operating spray nozzles from the seat of a tractor and when weeding rows of vegetables by hand.

"The one protects his crops with a hoe; the other with a spray," Herr Waitz said.

He thus arrived at the reassuring conclusion (reassuring if it is true, that is) that the soil is not being steadily poisoned (with a resulting decline in fertility that can only be offset by larger doses of artificial fertiliser).

He doubted whether it was true to say that farming was so intensive in the Federal Republic that the natural balance of pests and useful fauna could no longer be restored and more and more species were having to be redlisted as in danger of extinction.

He was equally doubtful about claims that farmers used chemicals "for all they were worth."

They had long abandoned any belief they might have had that: "If at first you don't succeed, spread still more fertiliser."

Sales of artificial fertilisers and crop sprays had declined slightly in the Federal Republic for seven or eight years — which was hardly to the liking of his company, as a commercial, profit-oriented enterprise.

This frank admission probably best explained why advocates and critics of industrial agro-business differ so substantially in their assessment of the situation.

The previous speaker, Hubert Weinzierl of BUND, the German Environmental Protection and Nature Conservation League, had outlined an entirely different view of German soil and the men and women who cultivated it.

He said the soil had long been terminally ill. Mother Earth faced a constant threat of erosion, yet the failure of Europe's Common Agricultural Policy was not even seen as an opportunity for a fresh start.

"We are carrying on as though food shortages were the problem, as in the postwar period, and not surpluses," he complained.

Three hundred pesticide agents in 2,000 different varieties were constantly spread on soil to ensure that crops were healthy and yields lucrative.

They totalled 30,000 tonnes of pesticide a year, compared with which the 40 tonnes that polluted the Rhine from the Sandoz works at Basle seems little more than a drop in the ocean.

So it is hardly surprising that traces of atrazine are found in ground water and of nitrates in vegetables — or that there has been such a dramatic decline in the number of species within a single human generation.

As long as chemicals policy continued — despite Sandoz, Seveso and Bhopal — to be dictated by the manufacturers little progress could be expected, Herr Weinzierl said.

Reluctance to do anything about what has become routine could also be experienced on a smaller scale. Many people seemed to see and think of chemicals and "green" as somehow symbiotic.

Agriculture at its most intensive prevailed in twelve million German gardens. Toxins were used so indiscriminately that farmers' fields were an ecological paradise in comparison.

"As long as these toxic orgies are not brought to an end," he said, "we can hardly point an accusing finger at the farmer."

Anyone who had expected the scientists to side clearly with one view or the other, both so forcefully expressed, was in for a disappointment.

"We don't really know anything specific about the threat to the soil," said Professor Fred Klingauf of the Federal Biological Research Establishment.

There were signs that "biologically cultivated" soil contained substantially more micro-organisms (vital for natural soil fertility) and that chemical sprays killed between 50 and 100 per cent of micro-organisms.

But proof that a chemical time-bomb threatened the survival of agriculture as we know it could only be arrived at in long-term surveys.

A 20-year survey by Max Planck research scientists had, for instance, recently shown that intensive cultivation of a smallholding gradually eliminated songbirds (which have an ecological role too).

The Federal government, he said, was now prepared to bankroll long-term surveys of this kind but it would be unwise to await their findings. Swift action was needed, as on tree deaths (the cause of which is similarly disputed).

Professor Klingauf felt farmers ought to switch as soon as possible to methods more attuned to nature. The new Plant Protectives Act with its stricter licensing provisions was a step in the right direction.

Even so, the "extent to which violence can be used on nature to satisfy human needs," to quote Professor Gunther Weinschenk of Hohenheim University, Stuttgart, was by no means undisputed by platform speakers.

Baden-Württemberg Agriculture Minister Gerhard Weiser, a former Environmental Affairs Minister, felt obliged to warn against a reversion to past centuries.

We could not manage without chemicals, like our forefathers, who had to emigrate because they hadn't enough to eat.

He said the soil was still in reasonably good condition, so a gradual ecological restructuring (away from the constraints of the Common Agricultural Policy) stood a chance of success.

This was a view not all speakers shared. All agreed, however, that alternative agricultural policies would invariably be more expensive from the consumer's viewpoint.

They hoped that consumers would be prepared, in an age when many spent more on their car than on the food they ate, to pay more for food grown at less cost to the environment.

Green Bundestag deputy Antje Vollmer said the farmer's natural ally was not the chemical industry but the consumer who bought his produce.

Modern agriculture had profoundly humiliated the farmer, who was forced for the sake of short-term output to jeopardise the long-term survival of the land from which he earned his living.

Professor Weinschenk agreed, saying: "What matters is to give farmers back a sense of meaning in their work."

That they were in danger of losing it was readily apparent from the debate, especially in the context of the *Kirchentag* motto: "Give us this day our daily bread — and forgive us our trespasses."

Joachim Wille

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 June 1987)

Continued from page 12

were distinctly dangerous, they said, while others were useless but might stop patients from undergoing effective treatment.

Professor Reinhard Gotzen of Steglitz University Clinic, Berlin, said as conference chairman there was no question of rejecting nature cures as a matter of principle.

They were, however, neither better than conventional treatment as a matter of principle nor invariably harmless. Where they had no side-effects one must still consider whether they had any effect whatever.

Justin Westhoff

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 13 June 1987)

■ SOCIETY

Two children of their own and another five as well

DIE ZEIT

Barbara Latuske has seven children, two of her own and five adopted. She also works. Initial gushing admiration quickly turns to incomprehension.

Parents who want to adopt children have to show that they are suitable. The question often asked, with a hint of disapproval, is: "Why so many?"

Others see an ideal in the family thrown together and growing up together. The children, aged between two and 12, are happy and charming. Passers-by glance at them. They live partly in the public eye.

Six years ago Klaus and Barbara Latuske bought a renaissance house in Lübeck's Old Town and restored it.

They opened a school for the applied arts, a gallery and Barbara's wool shop in the former warehouse attached to the house.

The family lives crowded together on the upper floors. The only completed room is the 100 square metre children's room. In the meantime, most of the family life takes place at the dining table in the attractive kitchen.

It is astonishing how calmly and orderly things are in an ordinary day in such a large family, even through Laura, in the children's room, ponders out loud ~~that Emily bit her in the fingers twice~~ when they were eating.

She is now six. When she was eleven months old and weighing nine pounds she was brought to West Germany from an Indonesian children's home. She was the only one to rebel when more children joined the family.

To their own children Klaas and Ann-Marijke and an adopted baby Jan Barbara and Klaus Latuske added a little girl from Vietnam, Hanh, Lennart from India and finally Emily.

Barbara Latuske has long got used to people she encounters in the street or the supermarket trying to make sense out of the origins of the children.

Few people ask her questions to get information about the unusual family.

Not only children came into Barbara's wool shop when we were sitting there and Barbara's spinning wheel was incessantly humming away.

A woman came directly to Barbara Latuske from the youth welfare department, discouraged by the vague information about adoption she had received there.

She wanted to know how to adopt a child. Although Barbara Latuske gets irritated at the incompetence of the authorities responsible for adoptions she is discreet about making suggestions.

She wondered whether this vacillating woman would be able to survive all the red-tape involved in adopting a baby.

Barbara and Klaus Latuske are both 36. They got mixed up in the tangled web of adoption formalities when they could not have a third child of their own.

They joined the crowd of people applying to adopt children. They wanted to give a child from the Third World a better chance in life, and they became all the more determined when youth welfare officials rejected their applications on the grounds that a family with two small children was large enough already.

Barbara and Klaus have had trouble coming to terms with rigid German adoption measures since they became involved in the fate of starving, deserted, homeless children, of which there are millions.

When Klaus, an art teacher, and his wife, a teacher at a special school, were eventually issued with a foster care certificate and had lived and worked for some time in an Indonesian children's home, and had brought back baby Jan, they could not rid themselves of the memories of the hopeless living conditions of the children there.

They said that they asked themselves what these children would be able to make out of their lives. From this they had the idea of helping them.

Jan, an illegitimate child of a Chinese mother and a Moselm father, was not accepted into either of the two families in the Far East. But he has grown up with as few complications as Laura, who has brought to the children's home in Indonesia by her grandfather because neither he nor Laura's 15-year-old mother were able to feed her.

Hanh, 12, recently received a photo from her parents and brothers and sisters in Vietnam. Her father included a friendly letter telling her that she should be industrious and grateful to her adopted parents. Until now she has not replied to the letter.

She learned German within a few weeks and soon forgot her mother tongue. She learned a lot looking at reports in newspapers about the Boat People whose frightful experiences she had herself shared.

She went to sea with her aunt in a small open boat and saw Thai pirates attack it. For 18 months she was in a refugee camp in Thailand. In the end she was maltreated by her aunt. Just when Laura had got used to the family, Barbara and Klaus had decided not to abandon Lennart, the young boy "with the bad left leg" to his fate in a home in India, just then, on 23 December, the youth welfare office rang up and asked "whether we would take in Hanh as a Christmas guest and come and fetch her immediately." For a long time Hanh had a fear of bridges and water. When she arrived in the Latuske's family it was obvious that she was not going to be just a short-time guest. Barbara said: "She fitted in quite normally." Klaus and Barbara tried cautiously to correct Hanh's very negative view of Asia with books, films and chats about the Far East.

She came from a good family in Vietnam and it is hard to understand what reasons there could have been to consign the little girl to an uncertain fate.

But whatever the reasons Hanh, self-assured, is full of anger and a sense of guilt. Like so many of the children nothing is known of Lennart's origins. He has been poorly fed, had spinal injuries, a damaged pelvis and was lame in both legs.

Barbara said that "Lennart behaved just as it had been described to us an adopted child did behave." His cries day and night almost became too much for the family to bear.

The 18-month-old baby suffered from diarrhoea and had a chronic fe-

Continued on page 15

Step-children on the stairs ... the Latuske family at home. (Photo: Christoph Kell)

Agency ends its Third World adoption service

A child welfare organisation is to stop arranging Third World children for adoption by German parents.

After 20 years, Terre des Hommes is switching its function to helping abandoned children in their own countries.

The reason is that not only abandoned children were being put up for adoption. Children of single mothers were also being offered simply because their mothers were unable to bring them up.

Terre des Hommes has placed about 2,500 children over the past 20 years. The Osnabrück-based organisation has a long waiting list. Every day an average of 10 couples wanting to adopt children contact it. But they will now be disappointed.

At Whitsun a meeting of Terre des Hommes members decided to close down the adoption programme.

With immediate effect absolute priority will be given to helping abandoned children in their own countries.

Investigations have shown that not only abandoned children were offered for adoption but also the children of single mothers. The main reason why these mothers were being separated from their children is that they do not have the means of rearing them.

Dr Peter Eisenblätter, head of the organisation's adoption organisation, said: "Children need parents and family, but primarily in the country where they were born."

In cooperation with partner organisations overseas mothers and families, threatened with separation, will be supported, attempts will be made to integrate abandoned children in their families and domestic adoptions will be encouraged.

Dr Eisenblätter continued: "Only when all else fails, and even then only in individual cases, will adoption parents in West Germany come into the picture."

About 1.5000 foreign children are adopted in West Germany annually. Adoptions for "at the most 400" of these children are arranged by state-approved organisations such as Terre des Hommes, Internationaler Sozialdienst or Pro Infante.

The remainder of these adoptions are arranged privately. Parents wanting to adopt a child pay as much as DM30,000 on the "grey market." Arrangements for the adoption of about 1,000 babies are made in the Federal Republic annually.

But the adoptions business in West Germany is shrinking. The gap between parents wanting to adopt children and children available for adoption is growing. In 1984 there were 20,000 parents wanting to adopt children but there was only 822 babies available for adoption.

Hildegard Weidenfeld-Schorsch for the Rhineland youth welfare office said: "When parents cannot adopt children from West Germany they turn abroad."

This has resulted in a boom in dealing with babies from countries such as Brazil, and baby-dealers and baby farms in Sri Lanka.


Not all workers in Terre des Hommes go along with the decision to close down the organisation's adoption activites. A private organisation has been set up in the Ruhr so that the field is not left entirely to the mercy of the private adoption agencies.

Helmut Schildkamp, a school principal from Neviges near Wuppertal, the father of three adopted children and for many years involved in Terre des Hommes adoption activities, will continue his work in foreign children adoptions with the "Eltern für Kinder" adoption agency that has been operating for the past 20 years

He said: "We do not want to compete with but amplify the work of other organisations. So long as their are orphans in children's homes and there are parents in West Germany, who want these children, we feel it our duty to bring these parents and children together."

Susanne Mäder

(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, Essen, 11 June 1987)



■ HORIZONS

The ideal secretary who spied for the Kremlin

Süddeutsche Zeitung

The accused looks like the ideal secretary for a place at the centre of power: she conveys an impression of technical competence, of knowing what to do and when, of reliability and unobtrusiveness, even of mousy insignificance.

Margret Höke is interested in culture and literature at a coffee-circle level. There is nothing extravagant about either her cultural tastes or her choice of clothes: she sits in courtroom A 01 in the cellar of the Düsseldorf courthouse discreetly dressed in conservative colours. Her small, plain face is decorated with thin, gold-framed spectacles.

Her expression varies between cool aloofness and an equally cool friendliness frozen in a stereotyped smile. The only signs of agitation are irregular red blotches which occasionally appear on her pallid cheeks.

For the best part of a quarter of a century, Frau Höke impressed everybody with her attitudes: her reliability, her sense of responsibility, her efficiency, her loyalty and her discretion.

Then one day they discovered she was spying for the Soviet Union. Not only that. She was the most successful KGB agent in Bonn.

For 15 years she worked in the office of the Bonn President and passed on everything she could lay her hands on: 1,717 documents, according to the charge sheet, that were either "confidential", "secret" or "top secret".

Why? The formula is far from unusual. A lonely woman meets a nice man. Women who become traitors because of love is a classic scenario.

And in the small-town, provincial atmosphere of the civil-service town of Bonn, there is no shortage of bored and lonely people.

The case of Margret Höke illustrates probably better than any other just how prone to advances from East Bloc Romeos otherwise irreproachable secretaries can be. She told the court her story in quiet, faltering tones. Often she looked at the floor as she spoke.

She was arrested two years ago, and in the interim has had plenty of time to reconstruct exactly what led her into a relationship with "Franz Becker", the KGB agent controller who clearly picked out the now 51-year-old, probably on the tip of another mole.

Margret Höke has managed to work out the reason: it lay in psychological problems with origins in her childhood which she could not shake herself free from.

She told about a narrow-minded, lower middle class upbringing which was to lead to difficulties in her abilities in relating to men. She grew up in the small Westphalian town of Löhne, the second daughter of a cabinet maker in a family where the mother was the dominant figure. The father was strongly involved in the church as an elder.

"I was brought up completely dependent on others," she said. She never learnt to get on with people. As a child she was unable to make real friendships and she compensated by doing handwork to attract attention. She was shy and quiet and had the feeling that no one noticed her.

"Perhaps it began because I was not meant to have been born at all and then when I was, I was not a boy."

She graduated from *Realschule* and was taken on as an employee with the local council.

When she was 22, her parents tried with all their might to marry her off to an officer with the council, but she resisted fiercely. She and her parents quarrelled endlessly over the subject. The quarrelling worsened and one day her father hit her.

She applied secretly to the Bonn Foreign Office to get away from home and travelled for an interview without their knowledge. A doctor she knew and trusted — her mother had introduced the two but nothing came of it — helped her in her efforts to leave her family and intercepted letters to her so they wouldn't be opened by her parents.

"I needed a lot of strength to make the break," she says now.

For the next 14 months, Frau Höke worked at the Foreign Office. Then, in May 1959, she was transferred to the Presidential Office. Theodor Heuss was President. She continued there with all succeeding presidents up to the incumbent, Richard von Weizsäcker.

She worked with success and in 1972, when she was already working as an agent, she was decorated with the Federal Medal for Distinguished Service; on the occasion of a state visit she received the Spanish Silver Cross of the Isabela Católica order; and the First Class Medal of the Finnish White Rose.

But she was not happy. She wasn't having any luck with men. "That was because I couldn't form any real relationships," she says. An example was her affair with a civil servant to whom she became engaged over dinner one night only for the whole idea to be forgotten the next morning when she realised the man had other ideas.

In another case, she felt herself unable to go any further in the relationship. She was afraid. Today, she blames her relationship with her mother which, despite the friction, she maintained during her time in Bonn. Even in later years, she says, all she heard from her mother was criticism. "I was under psychological stress. The pressure was making me ill."

The head of the bench is Judge Klaus Wagner, a lawyer whose thinking is sometimes a little wooden, inflexible. He interrupted Frau Höke impatiently. When was this talk about childhood going to finish? All this psycho- analysing was not helping. Frau Höke: "It is incomprehensible, but it simply was that way."


Judge Wagner: "The mother has been playing far too great a role in this hearing."

Frau Höke corrected him: "In my life." Certain things "simply can't be erased."

Next the young Bonn secretary found security in "a very nice, evangelical communal home". Everyone took their turns cooking for one another and went to concerts and recitals together. But she was still unable to get to grips with her problems.

She turned to metaphysics, esotery, yoga and naturopathy, anthroposophy, numerology and transmigration of souls. She visited seminars and devotion services. She changed her diet.

She spent many hours discussing her problems with a psychologist. During a four-week period in a clinic, she was found to have weaknesses in her nervous system. So this was the woman the KGB ssought out: a woman at the centre of the government apparatus but internally unstable and tormented with self doubt.



Unable to form personal relationships ... Margret Höker. (Photo: dpa)

On 2 July 1968, Margret Höke, then 32, went to call her parents from a telephone box near her home when she was spoken to by a man six years younger.

He said he lived nearby. He introduced himself as Franz Becker, a student at university in Bonn. He had passed his Abitur in East Germany and then, he said, had fled.

The two spent the next hour walking on the banks of the Rhine. A few weeks later, the relationship had become intimate. The Romeo from the East had struck. Margret Höke was in the bag. And in the ensuing years, she went in deeper and deeper.

"Franz" later said he was a member of an extreme right-wing South American organisation -- a tactic often used by KGB agents. "Becker" asked for information from the Presidential office, at first more to test the new contact rather than anything else. Then he asked for specific items.

Frau Höke delivered, although even then it must have been clear that he was working for an East Bloc secret service. She reported what she had read at the office. At her home, documents were encoded into newspapers and later photographed.

When Franz Becker had achieved his objective — that is hired Margret Höke — he disappeared from the scene and reappeared only every five months or so; from the end of the 1970s a "Renate" was brought in as courier although Frau Höke at first reacted strongly to this. She was there for Franz and for no one else.

But Franz prevailed: in front of a Cologne museum, "Renate" took possession of a film hidden in a hairbrush. Spying techniques became more and more professional. And Frau Höke became more and more productive. She was rewarded with 500 marks a month, with gifts of jewellery and holiday trips.

Once she even tried to use a miniature camera disguised as a lipstick tube to photograph documents at the office, but she was interrupted, lost her nerve and stopped. Meetings in Cologne, Zurich, Copenhagen or Salzburg were arranged by a system of signals drawn in chalk on two specific lamp posts in Bonn.

With hindsight, Frau Höke now says she cannot understand why she did it. She has always agreed with West Germany's political system. The key she sees in her relationship with "Franz", although she had problems with him from the beginning. But she had wanted somebody and had simply complied. "For me, he was the person. He listened to my problems. He was my life."

Hans-Ulrich Jörges

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 19 June 1987)

Continued from page 14

of human contacts. Barbara said: "We had to take hold of ourselves. There were moments when we thought we could not go on, because we did not know just when it would all end. For two years we had the feeling that we had not got through to Lennart. He went off with any and every stranger."

Thanks to the doctors Lennart is no longer a problem child. He has got over his infant disabilities although he still has one leg shorter than the other. If, in the night, he crawls into bed with his brothers and sisters their bed will also probably be wet.

Barbara is convinced that the interplay of relationships between the brothers and sisters has played an important role.

She said: "I see red when we hear people saying that the love we give to so many children means that we give less to our own."

She continued: "The children gain from each other, qualities that we do not have. They learn to look at the world around them, to feel self-confident."

Klaas, who, as the eldest, has to cope with his growing number of brothers and sisters, does not keep his opinions to himself.

He has to do without a lot of the things his friends have and his toys get bashed about sometimes.

But while Klaas lists this and that he changes his position so that he can keep an eye on the children.

One day he will himself adopt children. Abundance here and poverty there, these are themes that Klaas knows more about than other children his age.

Probably under the assumption that where there are many there is always room for one more the youth welfare department called on Barbara and Klaus four years ago about a foster child. "If the worst comes to the worst red-tape is forgotten," she said with a trace of bitterness.

Adopting children from the Third World has fallen into disrepute. The state-approved adoption agencies in West Germany such as Internationaler Sozialdienst, Pro Infante and Terre des Hommes, support legislation that puts a stop to the unscrupulous business of child adoption.

Barbara and Klaus know well, when a child comes to them that adopting foreign children contributes to this business. They are also aware that it helps perpetuate social evils and individual cases make it easier to forget mass misery

Have the children found a new, happier life here? Barbara answered: "One must not forget the conditions from which they come. Their fates, about which I know a little, haunt me. Our children were born into such appalling conditions that we can only try to make things a little better for them."

Others look at the strange family makeup and wonder what it is all about.

Barbara said: "A teacher recently asked me what percentage of love was available for each child."

She didn't answer. How much percentage? That could never be measured.

Bettina Schroeter-Kleist

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 19 June 1987)